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In 2007, the year in which the centenary of the Hague Peace
Conference of 1907 was being commemorated, the treatment of
several hundred men by the United States at its base in
Guantdnamo Bay was a very prominent issue on the global human
rights agenda. Of course, the impact on human rights of state
action abroad is a much larger phenomenon. Beyond Guantdnamo
and secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) "black" detention
sites, there was in 2007 a series of occupations, from the long-
standing Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory to the
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occupation of Iraq since 2003, initially conducted through the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).' Alongside state-
1. For commentary on the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, see, ALLAN
GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1978) [hereinafter
GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW]; INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: Two DECADES OF ISRAELI
OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP (Emma Playfair ed., 1992); HUMAN
RIGHTS, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE OCCUPIED
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (Stephen Bowen ed., 1997); EYAL BENVENISTI, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION ch. 5 (2d prtg. 2004); DAVID KRETZMER, THE
OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES (2002) [hereinafter THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE]; Allan Gerson, Trustee
Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel's Presence in the West Bank, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1
(1973) [hereinafter Gerson, Trustee Occupant]; Adam Roberts, Decline of Illusions: The
Status of Israeli Occupied Territories Over 21 Years, 64 INT'L AFFAIRS 345, (1988); Francis
A. Boyle, The Creation of the State of Palestine, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 301 (1990); James
Crawford, The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L.
307 (1990); Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied
Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (1990); Peter Malanczuk, Israel: Status,
Territory and Occupied Territories, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 1468 (1995);
Yoram Dinstein, The International Legal Status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 37 (1998); Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal Gross &
Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Territory, 23 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 551 (2005). For commentary on the occupation of Iraq, see, e.g., BENVENISTI,
supra, at vii-xv; NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR.AND THE ETHICS OF
NATION BUILDING (2004); David Glazier, Introduction, 31 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 1 (2009); Jeff McMahan, The Morality of Military Occupation, 31 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 6 (2009); Jeremy Waldron, Post Bellum Aspects of the Laws of Armed
Conflict, 31 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 29 (2009); Kristen E. Boon, Obligations of
the New Occupier: The Contours of Jus Post Bellum, 31 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
54 (2009); Noah Feldman, Better Sixty Years of Tyranny Than One Night of Anarchy, 31
LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 137 (2009); THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ: THE OFFICIAL
DOCUMENTS OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (Stefan Talmon ed., Hart
Publishing, forthcoming Aug. 2010; Gil Baldwin, Iraq-Managing the Peace, 3 CONFLICT,
SEC. & DEV. 431 (2003); Eyal Benvenisti, TheSecurity Council and the Law on
Occupation: Resolution 1483 on Iraq in Historical Perspective, 1 Isr. Def. Forces L. Rev. 19
(2003); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The United Nations on Shifting Sands: About the
Rebuilding of Iraq, 5 Int'l L. F. 254 (2003); Adeed I. Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, How to
Build a Democratic Iraq, 82:3 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, at 32 (May/June 2003); Graham Day
and Christopher Freeman, Policekeeping is the Key: Rebuilding the Internal Security
Architecture of Postwar Iraq, 79 INT'L AFFAIRS 299 (2003); Toby Dodge, A Sovereign
Iraq?, 46:3 SURVIVAL, Autumn 2004, at 39; Thomas D. Grant, The Security Council and
Iraq: An Incremental Practice, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 823 (2003); Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad,
Problems of Belligerent Occupation: The Scope of Powers Exercisedby the Coalition
Provisional Authority in Iraq, April/May 2003-June 2004, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 253
(2003); R. Dobie Lagenkamp & Rex J. Zedalis, What Happens to the Iraqi Oil?: Thoughts
on Some Significant, Unexamined International Legal Questions Regarding Occupation of
Oil Fields, 14 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 417 (2003); Chappell Lawson, How Best to Build
Democracy: Laying a Foundation for the New Iraq, 82:4 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jtly/Aug.
2003, at 206; Liesbeth Lijnzaad, How Not to Be an Occupying Power: Some Reflections on
UN Security Council Resolution 1483 and the Contemporary Law of Occupation, in
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conducted occupation was the administration of territories by
international organizations, what I term, "International Territorial
Administration" (ITA).2 An example of ITA is the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which
MAKING THE VOICE OF HUMANITY HEARD 298 (Liesbeth Lijnzaad, Johanna Van
Sambeek, & Bahia Tahzib-Lie eds., 2003); Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Post-War
Settlement in Iraq: The UN Security" Council Resolution 1483 (2003) and General
International Law, 8 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 307 (2003); Judith Richards Hope & Edward
N. Griffin, The New Iraq: Revising Iraq's Commercial Law is a Necessity for Foreign Direct
Investment and the Reconstruction of Iraq's Decimated Economy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L 876 (2004); S. Chesterman, Occupation as Liberation: International Humanitarian
Law and Regime Change, 18 ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS 51 (2004); James Thuo Gathii,
Foreign and Other Economic Rights Upon Conquest and Under Occupation: Iraq in
Comparative and Historical Context, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 491 (2004); Theodore W.
Kassinger and Dylan J. Williams, Commercial Law Reform Issues in the Reconstruction of
Iraq, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 217 (2004); Greg Mills, Better with the UN? Searching for
Peace and Governance in Iraq, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 281 (2004); Michael
Ottolenghi, The Stars and Stripes in Al-Fardos Square: The Implications for the
International Law of Belligerent Occupation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177 (2004); John
Yoo, Iraq Reconstruction and the Law of Occupation, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 7
(2004); Marten Zwanenburg, Existentialism in Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1483 and
the Law of Occupation, 86 (issue No. 856) Int'l Rev. Red Cross 745 (2004); Nehal Bhuta,
The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 721 (2005); Daniel
Byman, Five Bad Options for Iraq, SURVIVAL, Spring 2005, at 7; Larry Diamond, Building
Democracy After Conflict: Lessons from Iraq, J. OF DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2005, at 9; James
Dobbins, Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War, 84:1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2005, at
16; TOBY DODGE, IRAQ'S FUTURE: THE AFTERMATH OF REGIME CHANGE, Adelphi
Paper No. 372 (2005); Gregory Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195
(2005); Conor McCarthy, The Paradox of the International Law of Military Occupation:
Sovereignty and the Reformation of Iraq, 10 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L., 51 (Spring 2005);
Adam Roberts, The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 27 (2005);
Marco Sassbli, Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying
Powers, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 661 (2005); Hilary Synnott, State-Building in Southern Iraq,
SURVIVAL, Summer 2005, at 33; Ralph Wilde, The Applicability of International Human
Rights Law to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Foreign Military Presence in
Iraq, 11 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 485 (2005); Rildiger Wolfrum, Iraq - From Belligerent
Occupation to Iraqi Exercise of Sovereignty: Foreign Power versus International
Community Interference, 9 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 1
(2005); Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War
and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580 (2006) [hereinafter Roberts, Transformative
Military Occupation]; Elaine Halchin, The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin,
Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
REPORT, June 6, 2005, available at http:/fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/48620.pdf.
2. On ITA, see generally, RALPH WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL
ADMINISTRATION: How TRUSTEESHIP AND THE CIVILIZING MISSION NEVER WENT
AWAY, passim (2008) [hereinafter WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL
ADMINISTRATION] and the sources cited therein. On the definition of "International
Territorial Administration" (ITA), see id. at ch. 1, § 1.4.
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operated from 1999 to 2008. 3 Although given relatively less
attention, these administrations also came under critical scrutiny
on human rights grounds.' For example, in 2002 the independent
Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo stated:
UNMIK is not structured according to democratic principles,
does not function in accordance with the rule of law, and does
not respect important international human rights norms. The
people of Kosovo are therefore deprived of protection of their
basic rights and freedoms three years after the end of the
conflict by the very entity set up to guarantee them.... It is
ironic that the United Nations, the self-proclaimed champion of
human rights in the world, has by its own actions placed the
people of Kosovo under UN control, thereby removing them
from the protection of the international human rights regime
that formed the justification for UN engagement in Kosovo in
the first place.'
As will be discussed further in this piece, analysis of the
question of the rights and obligations of foreign and international
actors administering territory that is not their own sovereign
territory has tended to focus on particular instances. Even when a
broader frame of reference has been adopted, often arbitrary,
question-begging classifications have been adopted to distinguish
between situations. One notable distinction of this sort is between
3. On UNMIK, see id. at 1-12, 1-2 n.1, 16-18, 20, 22 n.64, 32-3, 34 n.95, 35, 42-3, 47,
54-6, 58, 60, 76, 85-6, 93, 95, 108-09, 138, 144-46, 148-50, 193-96, 199, 204 n.47, 206-07, 210,
212-13, 215-16, 220, 221-24, 226-31, 233-35, 238, 241-45, 250-52, 255, 257-59, 260 n.75, 261,
264-65, 270 n.120, 273-74, 275 n.140, 276-77, 290-91, 292 n.12, 293-96, 298 n.31, 301, 312
n.84, 344-53, 357-62, 382-84, 405, 413, 419-20, 424 n.541, 426, 427 n.553, 430, 433, 439, 440
n.9, 441 n.11, 442, 446-47, 449-50, 452 n.41, 455, 457 and the works in the List of Sources,
sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.
4. See generally U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee: Kosovo (Serbia), U.N. Doc. CCPR/CJUNK/CO/1 (Aug. 14, 2006)
[hereinafter Observations of the Human Rights Committee]; Council of Europe, Alvaro
Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, Kosovo: The Human Rights Situation and
the Fate of Persons Displaced from their Homes, COM (2002) 11 final (Oct. 16, 2002)
[hereinafter Kosovo: The Human Rights Situation]; Amnesty Int'l, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Kosovo): International Officials Flout International Law, Al Index EUR
70/008/2002, Sept. 1, 2002, available at http://web.amnesty.orgllibrary/index/
engeur700082002 [hereinafter International Officials Flout International Law]. See also
citations infra, note 5.
5. OMBUDSPERSON INST. KOSOVO, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 2001-2002, at 1, 5
(July 10, 2002), available at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/repository/docs/
E6020710a.pdf. For further criticisms, see the first three annual reports and the ten special




occupation, on the one hand, and trusteeship, on the other. A
second such distinction is between state-conducted activity, on the
one hand, and international-organization-conducted activity, on
the other.
This piece examines the assumptions that lead to such
classifications and distinctions, and, in the light of this analysis,
considers the extent to which these classifications and distinctions
assist in understanding both the political character of, and the
human rights norms applicable to, the activities to which they
relate. It will be argued that the distinction commonly made
between trusteeship and occupation is without merit, and the
differences between foreign state and international-organization-
conducted territorial administration are of much less significance
than they have been made out to be. It will be suggested that a
crucial insight in relation to this enquiry is offered by a return to
the worldview of 1907 and the concept of occupation contained in
the Hague Regulations, when that concept is then analyzed within
a broader historical context.
II. WHAT IS OCCUPATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC
POLICY?
Before engaging in a comparative analysis between them, it is
necessary to consider some of the concepts under evaluation
separately. Commencing with occupation, this term is used in law
to denote territorial control by a state or group of states over
territory the title to which is not vested in the state or states
concerned; in law, claiming or altering this title through the
occupation is legally prohibited.7 Many instances of occupation
6. The concept of occupation in the Hague Regulations relevant for present
purposes is contained in the Regulations from both 1899 and 1907. See Convention with
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Regulations Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, art. XLIII, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 26 Martens Nouveau
Recueil (ser. 2) 949 [hereinafter Hague Regulations 1899]; Convention Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, art. XLIII, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3)
461 [hereinafter Hague Regulations 1907].
7. See generally BENVENISTI, supra note 1; Adam Roberts, What is a Military
Occupation?, 55 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 249 (1984) [hereinafter Roberts, What is a Military
Occupation?]. On the international law of belligerent occupation, see Hague Regulations
1899, supra note 6, at arts. 42-56; Hague Regulations 1907, supra note 6, at. arts. 42-56;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
2009]
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Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 2, 27-34, 47-78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL.,
COMMENTARY-GENEVA CONVENTION IV: RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR (1958) (See, in particular, commentary to Article 2
(2), 21-2) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION]; U.K.
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2004);
Sylvain Vit6, L'applicabilit6 du droit international de l'occupation militaire aux activitds des
organisations internationales, No. 853 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 9 (2004) (Fr.); HANS-PETER
GASSER, THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 240-79 and
sources cited therein (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995); GERSON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1; GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 25 (1995); THE OCCUPATION
OF JUSTICE, supra note 1; Arnold Wilson, The Laws of War in Occupied Territory, 18
TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 17 (1932); Gerson, Trustee Occupant, supra
note 1; Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 1; David J. Scheffer,
Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 842, (2003); Bhuta, supra note 1; Steven R.
Ratner, Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The Challenges
of Convergence, 16 EUR..J. INT'L L. 695, 696 (2005); Daniel Thurer, Speech at 6th Bruges
Colloquium: Current Challenges to the Law of Occupation (Oct. 20-21, 2005), available at
http://www.icrc.org; BENVENISTI, supra note 1. Under Article 42 of the Hague
Regulations 1907, "[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such
authority has been established and can be exercised." Article 43 of the Hague Regulations
1907 refers to "[t]he authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands
of the occupant." According to Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, supra. at 251-52,
the test in Article 42 "consists of direct control" by the "armed forces" of the occupying
state. This test has an "implicit assumption that- an occupant exercises authority directly
through its armed forces, rather than indirectly through local agents." Id. This implicit
assumption "is also evident" in Article 43, and "also seems to be taken for granted" in
Articles 48-49, 51-53 and 55. Id. Roberts concludes that "[a]n open and identifiable
command structure is thus a central feature of the Hague definition of military
occupation." Id. On the Hague test for applicability, see also Prosecutor v. Naletilic and
Martinovic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber Judgment, 217 (Mar. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Naletilic, Trial
Chamber Judgment]. Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 makes the
conventions applicable to "all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance." See
Geneva Convention I, supra at art. 2; Geneva Convention II, supra, at art. 2; Geneva
Convention III, supra, at art. 2; Geneva Convention IV supra, at art. 2. More generally,
see Geneva Convention IV supra, at arts. 27-34, 47-78. On the test in occupation law
generally, Roberts states that "[a]t the heart of treaty provisions, court decisions and legal
writings about occupations is the image of the armed forces of a state exercising some kind
of domination or authority over inhabited territory outside the accepted international
frontiers of their State and its dependencies." Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?,
supra at 300. BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 4, defines occupation as "effective control of a
power (be it one or more states or an international organization, such as the United
Nations) over a territory to which that power has no sovereign title, without the volition of
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involve the conduct of administration. As a matter of law,
administration is treated separately from the mere exercise of
control, in that the fact of the exercise of control triggers
substantive obligations that presuppose the conduct of
administration.8
Many occupations result from military conflict. As a matter of
law, the Hague formulation of 1907 (replicating the formulation of
the sovereign of that territory." The previous two quotes illustrate the idea that
occupation denotes situations where the occupier lacks title. Not only is this the case as a
matter of the factual definition of occupation; the law of occupation also prohibits
annexation by the occupying state or states, reflecting an underlying policy objective that
changes in territorial status cannot be brought about through the threat or use of military
force. Eyal Benvenisti states that "[t]he foundation upon which the entire law of
occupation is based is the principle of inalienability of sovereignty through the actual or
threatened use of force. Effective control by foreign military force can never bring about
by itself a valid transfer of sovereignty." BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 5. See also id. at xi;
Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, supra, at 582-85. This idea is implicated in
the notion that the relationship between the occupier and the occupied territory is one of
"trust," discussed further below, infra note 25. Of course, in practice states have used
occupation as a device for altering the status of the ierritory concerned; this is discussed in
WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, Ch. 8, section
8.3.1.
8. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE 362 (1956) states that "[m]ilitary government is the form of administration by
which an occupying power exercises governmental authority over occupied territory"
(quoted in BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 4-5, n.8.). Eyal Benvenisti states that Article 43 of
the Hague Regulations 1907, by defining occupation as a situation where "the authority of
.the legitimate power ha[s] in fact passed into the hands of the occupant," assumes that an
occupant will introduce a system of administration, and obliges it to do so. Id. at 4, n. 8 and
accompanying text. Explaining the nature of and rationale for an administrative structure,
Benvenisti states that "it is of little significance whether the occupant chooses to establish
a system of military administration or a civil one, or a mixture of both. What is important
is the establishment of a separate system by the occupant to execute the powers and duties
allotted to it by the law of occupation." Id. at 5 (citing BRITISH WAR OFFICE, MANUAL
OF MILITARY LAW, PART III: THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND 145, 518 (1958)). It might
also be said that, if the substantive obligations give rise to a need to conduct
administration, the factual trigger for their operation-the exercise of control-must
include a capacity to exercise such administration. In Naletilic, Trial Chamber Judgment,
supra note 7, 217, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia stated that "[t]o determine whether the authority of the occupying
power has been actually established," one guideline that provides "some assistance" is
that "the occupying power must be in a position to substitute its own authority for that of
the occupied authorities, which must have been rendered incapable of functioning
publicly." However, this dictum is articulated in the context of what might indicate the
existence of occupation rather than what is necessary for a situation to constitute
occupation. So, for example, another guideline cited by the Trial Chamber is that "the
occupying power has issued and enforced directions to the civilian population," an activity
which, although indicating the existence of an occupation and fulfilling the obligations of
occupation law, is not required for occupation per se to exist. Id.
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1899) seems to presuppose a belligerent context as part of the
trigger for applicability, whereas the Geneva formulation of 1949
does not. 9 Commentators now prefer to use the generic term
"occupation" to cover both belligerent and non-belligerent
occupations, even if in some respects the applicable legal regime
may differ between each. In the words of Eyal Benvenisti:
The law of occupation developed as part of the law of war.
Initially, occupation was viewed as a possible by-product of
military actions during war, and therefore it was referred to in
legal literature as "belligerent occupation." But the history of
the twentieth century has shown that occupation is not
necessarily the outcome of actual fighting: it could be the result
of a threat to use force that prompted the threatened
government to concede effective control over its territory to a
foreign power; occupation could be established through an
armistice agreement between the enemies; and it could also be
the product of a peace agreement. Moreover, because of many
occupants' reluctance to admit the existence of a state of "war"
9. Article 42 of the Hague Regulations 1907 states that "[t]erritory is considered
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army." Hague
Regulations 1907, supra note 6, at art. 42. See also, in identical terms, Hague Regulations
1899, supra note 6, at art. 42. Adam Roberts states that this provision "appears to be based
on an assumption that a military occupation occurs in the context of a war." Roberts, What
is a Military Occupation?, supra note 7, at 251. See also U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
supra note 7, at 274, ch. 11, 1 11.1.1, 11.2. Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions
(on scope of application) provides:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The
Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no
armed resistance.
Geneva Conventions I-IV, supra note 7, at art. 2, 1-2. The Commentary on the second
paragraph by the International Committee of the Red Cross states that:
[t]he wording adopted was based on the experience of the Second World War,
which saw territories occupied without hostilities, the Government of the
occupied country considering that armed resistance was useless. In such cases
the interests of protected persons are, of course, just as deserving of protection
as when the occupation is carried out by force.
.*. [the paragraph] does not refer to cases in which territory is occupied during
hostilities; in such cases the Convention will have been in force since the
outbreak of hostilities or since the time war was declared. The paragraph only
refers to cases where the occupation has taken place without a declaration of
war and without hostilities, and makes provision for the entry into force of the
Convention in those particular circumstances.
COMMENTARY ON THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION supra note 7 at 59-60.
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or of an international armed conflict, or their failure to
acknowledge the true nature of their activities on foreign soil,
the utility of retaining the adjectives "belligerent" or "wartime"
has become rather limited. Today the more inclusive term,
"occupations," is generally used. The emphasis is thus put not
on the course through which the territory came under the
foreign state's control, whether through actual fighting or
otherwise, but rather on the phenomenon of occupation.
III. WHAT IS TRUSTEESHIP IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC
POLICY?
A. General Concept
The concept of trusteeship in international law and public
policy seeks to explain the basis on which foreign rule should
operate and, potentially, the basis on which it might be brought to
an end." The introduction of international trusteeship can be
10. BENVENISTI,supra note 1, at 3-4 (citations omitted).
11. On trusteeship in international law and public policy, see generally FRANCISCO
DE VITORIA, ON THE AMERICAN INDIANS, IN POLITICAL WRITINGS (Anthony Pagden &
Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991); Edmund Burke, Speech on Mr. Fox's East India Bill (1783),
reprinted in THE SPEECHES OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE, IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS, AND IN WESTMINSTER HALL 406 (1816); Joseph Marc Hornung,
Civiliss et Barbares [The Civilized and the Barbarians], in 17 RECUEIL DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 17 559 (1885) (Fr.); Phillip Henry Kerr, Political Relations Between
Advanced and Backward Peoples, in AJ Grant, A Greenwood, JDI Hughes, PH Kerr and
FF Urquhart, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 141
(1916); CHARLES G. FENWICK, WARDSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1919; ALPHEUS
HENRY SNOW, THE QUESTION OF ABORIGINES IN THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
NATIONS, (1919); GR. BRIT. COLONIAL OFFICE, INDIANS IN KENYA, PARLIAMENTARY
PAPERS BY CM. (1923) at 10, quoted in WILLIAM BAIN, BETWEEN ANARCHY AND
SOCIETY: TRUSTEESHIP AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF POWER 62 (2003); M.F. LINDLEY,
THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1926); FREDERICK JOHN DEALTRY LUGARD, THE DUAL MANDATE IN BRITISH
TROPICAL AFRICA (3d ed. 1926); QUINCY WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS ch. 1 (1930); R.N. CHOWDHURI, INTERNATIONAL MANDATES AND
TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 13-16, 20-24, 35-36 (1955); Georg
Schwarzenberger, The Standard of Civilization in International Law, 8 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 212, 217 (1976); KENNETH ROBINSON, THE DILEMMAS OF TRUSTEESHIP:
ASPECTS OF BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY BETWEEN THE WARS (1965); GERRIT W.
GONG, THE STANDARD OF 'CIVILIZATION' IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 14-21 (1984);
ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND THE THIRD WORLD 71-74, 143 (1990); Anthony Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria and the
Colonial Origins of International Law, 5 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 321, 329 (1996) [hereinafter
Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria]; Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a
Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 903, 926 (1997); Anthony Anghie,
Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
understood as a response to two distinct conceptions of the pre-
existing governance structure in the territory. In the first place,
covering colonial trusteeship as well as state-conducted foreign
territorial administration under the Mandate and Trusteeship
systems, the racialized concept of a "standard of civilization" was
deployed to determine that certain peoples in the world were
"uncivilized", lacking organized societies, a position reflected and
constituted in the notion that their "sovereignty" was either
completely lacking, or at least of an inferior character when
compared to that of "civilized" peoples. 2 In the second place, also
covering certain forms of colonial trusteeship, foreign state-
conducted territorial administration under the Mandate and
Trusteeship systems, occupation and international territorial
administration, foreign rule has been introduced after conflict,
often in circumstances where governance in the territory was
degraded in some way by the conflict, for example, through the
collapse of a defeated government and the destruction of
infrastructure. 13
Understanding the exercise of administrative prerogatives
over territory in these two circumstances as "trusteeship"
conceptualizes the relationship between the foreign actor and the
territory and its people in a particular manner: the
trustee/guardian entity controls the beneficiary/ward territory,
Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 25-35, 52-54, 62-65 (1999) [hereinafter Anghie, Finding the
Peripheries]; Nicholas Tsagourias, Humanism and the Mandates System: Its Modern
Revival, 13 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 97 (2000); BILL ASHCROFT, GARETH GRIFFITHS &
HELEN TIFFIN, POST-COLONIAL STUDIES: THE KEY CONCEPTS 47 (2000); ROBERT
JACKSON, THE GLOBAL COVENANT: HUMAN CONDUCT IN A WORLD OF STATES ch. 11
(2000) [hereinafter JACKSON, THE.GLOBAL COVENANT]; A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION 291-95 (2001); MARTrI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF
NATIONS ch. 2 (2002); SIMON SCHAMA, A HISTORY OF BRITAIN, VOLUME 3: THE FATE
OF EMPIRE 1776-2000, 269-70 (2002); ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY
AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW chs. 1, 2 (2005) [hereinafter ANGHIE,
IMPERIALISM]; BONNY IBHAWOH, IMPERIALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COLONIAL
DISCOURSES OF RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN AFRICAN HISTORY (2006); Hisashi Owada,
Pres., Asian Soc'y of Int'l L., Inaugural Address at the Conference of the Asian Society of
International Law (Apr. 7, 2007) available at
http://law.nus.edu.sg/asiansiI/workingpapers/2007/doc/v2Speech %20Judge %200wada%20
at%20Asian%20SIL%20Singapore%207%209%2004%2007.pdf; WILDE,
INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, at ch. 8 § 8.3.2. See also
International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128, passim, and
in particular, at 149 (July 11) (separate opinion of Judge McNair).
12. See the sources cited supra note 11.
13. Id.
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acting on behalf of the latter entity - the "sacred trust of
civilization" or the "civilizing mission."
B. Colonial Trusteeship
Trusteeship became associated with some forms of post-
Renaissance European colonialism, as illustrated in Edmund
Burke's influential recitation of the concept in relation to British
rule in India in 1783:
[A]Il political power which is set over men and... all privilege
claimed or exercised in exclusion of them, being wholly
artificial, and for so much a derogation from the natural
equality of mankind, at large, ought to be some way or other
exercised ultimately for their benefit. If this is true with regard
to every species of political dominion, and every description of
commercial privilege, none of which can be original self-derived
rights, .or grants for mere private benefit of the holders, then
such rights or privileges, or whatever you choose to call them,
are all, in the strictest sense, a trust.
14. Id.
15. Burke, supra note 11, at 411 (emphasis in original). In its 1923 parliamentary
White Paper on Kenya, the British Government stated that they [sic] "regard themselves
as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population." GR. BRIT. COLONIAL OFFICE,
supra notell, at 10, quoted in BAIN, supra note 11, at 62. On this statement see, e.g.,
RONALD HYAM, BRITAIN'S IMPERIAL CENTURY, 1815-1914 265 (2002); SIMPSON, supra
note 11, at 291. So for Brian Simpson, in the case of British colonial ideology, "the basic
justifying conception, derived from the common law tradition, was trusteeship; colonial
peoples were the beneficiaries, the colonial power the trustee."' Id. The increased
significance of trusteeship ideas to colonialism over time is reflected in the comment by
James Hales that "despite the diversity of colonial aims in the nineteenth century, it is
clear that since the institution of the Mandate System, the governing principle behind all
colonial administration is that of trusteeship." James C. Hales, The Reform and Extension
of the Mandate System, 26 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 153, 155 (1940)
[herinafter Hales, Reform and Extension]. One of the definitions of "trusteeship" in the
Oxford English Dictionary is "[t]he function of a colonial power or other dominant people
as protectors of a subject people." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTION ARY 626 (2d ed. 1989),
available at http://www.oed.com [hereinafter OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY] (search for
"trusteeship"). On the association of trusteeship with colonialism generally, see all sources
cited supra note 11. This association was taken up by the international lawyers of the time,
as reflected in the following statement by Joseph Hornung in 1885: "[w]e accept the
hegemony and trusteeship of the strong but only in the interests of the weak and in view of
their full future emancipation." Hornung, supra note 11, at 559. On the relationship
between trusteeship and international law generally, see, e.g., the discussion in ANGHIE,
IMPERIALISM, supra notell, ch. 2; KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 11, ch. 2. As for the notion
reflected in the quote from Edmund Burke that colonial trusteeship denotes the colonial
power acting on behalf of the colonial peoples, this of course references the general idea
of a legal trust whereby the trustee acts on behalf of the beneficiary, not on its own behalf.
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A concept of trust was implicit in Article VI of Chapter I of
the General Act of the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, under which
the colonial powers in Africa were bound to "watch over the
preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement
of the conditions of their moral and material well-being."' 6
In the United Nations Charter, the Declaration Regarding
Non-Self-Governing Territories (Chapter XI) states:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume
responsibilities for the administration of territories whose
peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government
recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of
these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the
obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of
international peace and security established by the present
Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "trust" in the law of property as "[t]he confidence
reposed in a person in whom the legal ownership of property is vested to hold or use for
the benefit of another." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 624 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.oed.com (search for "trust"). Applying this to international
trusteeship, "ownership" is best understood in terms of the right to administer the
territory, as opposed to the enjoyment of territorial title (although title may sometimes
subsist). On the idea that international trusteeship denotes selfless rule, James Hales states
that "in perfect trusteeship, that the guardian of colonial peoples.., cannot seek any
advantage for himself." Hales, Reform and Extension, supra at 176-77. See, however, the
idea of the "dual mandate", discussed in WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL
ADMINISTRATION, Ch. 8, text accompanying n. 139 et seq. Edmund Burke is popularly
regarded as the original theorist of colonial trusteeship, but the concept is evident in the
ideas of Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolom6 de Las Casas in relation to Spanish
colonialism in the sixteenth century. See DE VITORIA, supra note 11, at 231-92. For
commentary, see Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria, supra note 11; ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM,
supra note 11, Ch. 1; BAIN, supra note 11, 15 etseq.; CHOWDHURI, supra note 11, at 20-24.
16. See General Act of the Conference at Berlin of the Plenipotentiaries of Great
Britain, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden-Norway, Turkey and the United States respecting: (1)
Freedom of Trade in the Basin of the Congo, (2) the Slave Trade, (3) Neutrality of the
Territories in the Basin of the Congo, (4) Navigation of the Congo, (5) Navigation of the
Niger, and (6) Rules for Future Occupation on the Coast of the African Continent,
Chapter I, art. VI, Feb. 26,1885, 165 Consol. T.S. 485 [hereinafter Berlin General Act]. In
its 1923 parliamentary White Paper on colonial rule in Kenya, the British Government
stated that the "object" of the trust exercised by the Crown in Kenya was the "protection
and advancement of the native races." GR. BRIT. COLONIAL OFFICE, supra note 11, at 10,
quoted in BAIN, supra note 11, at 62.
17. U.N. Charter art. 73. For commentary, see Ulrich Fastenrath, Article 73, in 2 THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1089-93 (Bruno Simma et al. eds.,
2d ed. 2002); H. DUNCAN HALL, MANDATES, DEPENDENCIES AND TRUSTEESHIP 285
(Kraus Reprint Co. 1972) (1948) [hereinafter HALL, MANDATES] ("The Declaration fully
recognizes national trusteeship in dependent areas. It defines the principles upon which
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As the language of these quotes suggests, the concept of trust
was understood by its proponents as a way of placing colonial rule
on an ethical, humanitarian footing.'" The move to humanize
colonial rule arose in part from concerns related to that which
'trusteeship' administration was called upon to replace: earlier
forms of state colonialism and/or control by corporate entities like
trading companies understood in terms of neglect, exploitation,
profit, and general irresponsibility. "
C. Mandate and Trusteeship Arrangements
Trusteeship was formally adopted as the basis for the
Mandate and Trusteeship systems after the two world wars,
conceived in relation to the detached colonies of the defeated
powers. 20 The Trusteeship system also covered former Mandated
national trusteeship should operate, thus giving international recognition to the long-
established national principle of the 'sacred trust."').
i8. See, e.g., BAIN, supra note 11, passim, especially at 1, 27-53; HALL, MANDATES,
supra note 17, at 98-99, and sources cited therein. This in turn reflected one of the reasons
for the idea of the standard of civilization as explained by Gerrit Gong: "Europe's need to
explain and justify its overlordship of non-European countries in other than merely
military terms." GONG, supra note 11, at 42.
19. Indeed, in the case of British colonialism, ideas of trusteeship originated in
attempts to regulate the activities of the British East India Company, the perceived failure
of which leading to calls for rule by the Crown and the eventual dissolution of the
company. See generally the discussion in ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, supra note 11, at 69, and
sources cited therein; BAIN, supra note 11, ch. 2. Antony Anghie reports that "[b]y the end
of the nineteenth century ... [t]he direct involvement of European States in the whole
process of governing resulted in a shift in the ideology justifying Empire from the vulgar
language of profit to that of order, proper governance and humanitarianism." Anghie,
Finding the Peripheries, supra note 11, at 37. In 1945, the international lawyer Philip
Marshall Brown stated that: "[a]rbitrary rule and selfish exploitation has gradually given
way to the recognition of the right of such [colonial] peoples to attain self-government and
enjoy their own material resources. The present war has given a great impetus to the
acceptance of the principle that colonial administration must be considered as a
trusteeship in behalf of the subject peoples." Philip M. Brown, Imperialism, 39 AM. J.
INT'L L. 84 (1945). On the notion that trusteeship administration would replace control by
"private companies that pursue no other objective than. immediate personal enrichment"
(CHARLES SALOMON, L'OCCUPATION DES TERRITOIRES SANS MAITRE 186 (1889)), see
the discussion in KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 11, at 144. On the general idea of the civilizing
mission as a shift towards a humanitarian ethic for colonialism, see DAVID K.
FIELDHOUSE, COLONIALISM 1870-1945: AN INTRODUCTION 173 (1981); KOSKENNIEMI,
supra note 11, at 129-30, 151.
20. On the Mandates system generally, including the system of oversight exercised by
the League Council and Mandates Commission under Article 22 of the League Covenant,
see SYDNEY OLIVIER, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND PRIMITIVE PEOPLES (1918);
FREDA WHITE, MANDATES (1926); AARON M. MARGALITH, THE INTERNATIONAL
MANDATES (1930); WRIGHT, supra note 11; LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THE MANDATES
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SYSTEM: ORIGINS, PRINCIPLES, APPLICATION (1945); HALL, MANDATES, supra note 17;
CHOWDHURI, supra note 11; ROBINSON, supra note 11; ITSEJUWA SAGAY, THE LEGAL
ASPECTS OF THE NAMIBIAN DISPUTE chs. 1-2 (1975); FREDERICK S. NORTHEDGE, THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS: ITS LIFE AND TIMES, 1920-1946 (1986) (especially ch. 9); ISAAK
DORE, THE INTERNATIONAL MANDATE SYSTEM AND NAMIBIA (1985); 1 OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW, §§ 94c-94f (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., Longman 9th
ed. 1992); CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY, NAURU: ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE UNDER
INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP (1992); CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERGENERATIONAL
TRUSTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 147-49 (1999); NETA CRAWFORD,
ARGUMENT AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS: ETHICS, DECOLONIZATION, AND
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION ch. 6 (2002) [hereinafter CRAWFORD, ARGUMENT AND
CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS]; KOSKENNIEMI, supra notell, at 170-74; BAIN, supra note
11, at ch. 4; Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria, supra note 11, at ch. 3, passim (and sources cited
therein); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 13
(2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW]; James C. Hales, The Creation and Application of the Mandate System (A Study in
International Colonial Supervision), in 25 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 185
(1939), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/742820 [hereinafter Hales, Creation and
Application]; Hales, Reform and Extension, supra note 15; HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, The
Mandate under International Law in the Covenant of the League of Nations, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL III, 29 (Hersch Lauterpacht & Elihu Lauterpacht eds., 1970);
WILLIAM R. LOUIS, The Era of the Mandates System and the Non-European World, in
THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds.,
1984); W. Michael Reisman, Reflections on State Responsibility for Violations of Explicit
Protectorate, Mandate, and Trusteeship Obligations, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 231(1989);
Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty,
Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
513, passim (2002); Nele Matz, Civilization and the Mandate System Under the League of
Nations as Origin of Trusteeship, 9 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. 47 (2005). See also
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Jurisdiction (Greece v.- U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 2 (Aug. 30); Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 5. (Mar.26); International. Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950
I.C.J. 128; South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319
(Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Dec. 21); South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr;
Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (second phase, Judgment of July 18); Certain Phosphate
Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240 (Preliminary Objections, Judgment of
June 26). For details of the territories covered, see CHOWDHURI, supra note 11, at ch. V,
144; CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at app. 2.
On the Trusteeship systein, see U.N. Charter, chs. XII, XIII, especially art. 77; HALL,
MANDATES, supra note 17; C.V.L. NARAYAN, UNITED NATIONS' TRUSTEESHIP OF NON-
SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES (1951); CHOWDHURI, supra note 11; CHARMIAN
EDWARDS TOUSSAINT, THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1956);
JAMES N. MURRAY, JR., THE UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM (D. Philip
Locklin et al. eds., 1957); DAVID E. LUARD, A HISTORY OF-THE UNITED NATIONS. VOL.
2: THE AGE OF DECOLONIZATION 1955-1965, especially ch. 5 (1989); OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, §§ 89-95, 152; JOHN KENT, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF COLONIALISM: BRITAIN, FRANCE AND BLACK AFRICA, 1939-1956 (1992); TOM
PARKER, THE ULTIMATE INTERVENTION: REVITALISING THE U.N. TRUSTEESHIP
COUNCIL FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 43-50 (2003); WEERAMANTRY, supra; D. Rauschning,
International Trusteeship System, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 1099 (Bruno Simma et al eds., 2d ed. 2002); REDGWELL, supra at 149-54;
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra at ch. 13 and
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territories, and was open to those territories "voluntarily placed
under the system by States responsible for their administration,"
but no placements in the latter category were made.2 The twin
notions of incapacity for self-administration and foreign state
administration on a trusteeship basis were the hallmarks of both
systems. According to Article 22 of the Covenant, the people of
Mandated territories were deemed "not yet able to stand by
themselves" and the administration of Mandated territories was a
"sacred trust of civilization."2 2 In the UN Charter, the concept of
Appendix 3; H. Duncan Hall, The Trusteeship System, 24 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 33 (1947)
[hereinafter Hall, The Trusteeship System]; Reisman, supra; Francis B. Sayre, Legal
Problems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 267
(1964); A. J. R. Groom, The Trusteeship Council: A Successful Demise, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AT THE MILLENNIUM: THE PRINCIPAL ORGANS 142 (Paul Taylor & A. J. R.
Groom eds., 2000); see also The United Nations and Decolonization,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization (last visited Dec. 21, 2009). For details of the
territories covered, see the relevant parts of CHOWDHURI, supra note 11, at ch. V and
especially, 144; CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
at app. 2. On supervision by the UN General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council, see
U.N. Charter art. 85, ch. XIII. For commentary on this supervision, see, e.g., R. Geiger,
The Trusteeship Council, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 1129 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002); Ralph Wilde, The Trusteeship
Council, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS ch. 8 (Thomas G. Weiss
& Sam Daws eds., 2007).
21. For territories actually covered under the system, see the relevant sources cited
supra note 20. On the Trusteeship system being open to other territories, but not being
used in this regard, see U.N. Charter art. 77 and the discussion and sources cited in
WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, at ch. 5 n.45
and accompanying text. For the non-use of the Trusteeship system as illustrated by the
case of South West Africa/Namibia see id. at ch. 5, § 5.5. For the rejection of all forms of
foreign territorial administration as part of the post-Second World War self-determination
entitlement (discussed further below) see also id. at ch. 8, § 8.5.1. And for the fact that the
Trusteeship system was not reactivated in relation to East Timor in 1999 see id. at ch. 8,
text accompanying note 541. The non-use generally is discussed further in id. at ch. 8, text
accompanying nn.118, 327, 345. Several classes of Mandated territories were not
transferred to the Trusteeship system. First, those territories that had become or would
become independent (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine [what is now Israel, Jordan, and the
Occupied Territories]); second, the islands in the Pacific north of the Equator, which had
been Japanese Mandates and became a "strategic Trust area" administered by the United
States; and third, South West Africa. See D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 130-31 (6th ed. 2004).
22. On the origins of the Mandate system, see WRIGHT, supra note 11, at ch. 1. On
the origins of the Trusteeship system, see CHOWDHURI, supra note 11, at 27-35. On the
provisions for trusteeship and development for Trust Territories, see U.N. Charter, supra
note 17, at art. 76. On the trusteeship basis for the Mandate arrangements, see, e.g., Hales,
Reform and Extension, supra note 15, at 177-87. Reflecting the connection between these
arrangements and colonial trusteeship, and the influence of Edmund Burke on that earlier
paradigm, Peter Lyon states that Article 22 of the League Covenant was the "ripe fruit or
late blossom of Burkean ideas". Peter Lyon, The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of
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trust is reflected in the name given to the arrangements, and the
designation of incapacity made by implication in the provision for
trusteeship itself and the objectives for trusteeship administration,
such as the promotion of development.' Thus, the imperial
concept of colonial trusteeship was refashioned as the explicit basis
for a set of modified colonial arrangements.24
D. Occupation as Trusteeship
With respect to the relationship between occupation and
trusteeship, (Sir) Arnold Wilson stated in 1932:
[E]nemy territories in the occupation of the armed forces of
another country constitute (in the language of Art. 22 of the
League of Nations Covenant) a sacred trust, which must be
administered as a whole in the interests of both the inhabitants
and of the legitimate sovereign or the duly constituted successor
in title. 2
International Trusteeship, 31 J. COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 96, 99 (1993). In its
definition of "trusteeship," the Oxford English Dictionary covers colonial trusteeship and
the UN Trusteeship arrangements, but not the Mandate arrangements. OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, supra note 15 (See definitions cited supra note 15, infra note 23). In one of
the examples given of the use of the word to refer to UN Trusteeship, howeve r, the
previous status of the UK Trust Territory of the Cameroons as a British Mandate is
mentioned. Id. (See definition cited infra note 23).
23. One of the definitions of 'trusteeship' in the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
supra notel5, is "[t]he administration of a territory by a nation acting on behalf of the
United Nations Organization."
24. On the common origins and bases for both systems, see, e.g., CHOWDHURI, supra
note 11, passim, and especially 8-12 and ch. III; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 20, § 89; HARRIS, supra note 21, at 130. The notion that Mandated territories
were a class of colonies is illustrated, for example, in the sub-title of James Hales' study of
the Mandate arrangements, 'A Study in International Colonial Supervision'. See Hales,
Reform and Extension, supra note 15
25. WILSON, supra note 7, at 38. Gerhard von Glahn defines occupation as "a
temporary right of administration on a sort of trusteeship basis." VON GLAHN, supra note
7, at 668. Adam Roberts states that "the idea of 'trusteeship' is implicit in all occupation
law.., all occupants are in some vague and general sense trustees." Roberts, What is
Military Occupation, supra note 7, at 295 (citing WILSON, supra note 7; VON GLAHN,
supra note 7 (the same quote contained in an earlier edition)). For Roberts, the law of
occupation in both the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions "can be
interpreted as putting the occupant in a quasi-trustee role." Id. See also the discussion by
Perritt, who describes the occupations of post-Second World War Germany and Japan,
and the CPA occupation of Iraq, as instances of the exercise of trust. Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, 8 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
385, 410-16, 422 (2003) (general discussion of trusteeship and occupation); id. at 393-95
(on Germany); id. at 395-96 (on Japan); id. at 407-10 (on Iraq). In 1973, Allan Gerson
proposed a concept of "trustee occupation" to be applied to Israel's presence in the
Palestinian Territories. The idea was that this would enable the situation under evaluation
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Gerhard von Glahn considers occupation to operate on a
trusteeship basis denoting a "temporary right of administration"
operating "until the occupation ceases." 26 Eyal Benvenisti states
that the "occupant's status is conceived to be that of a trustee."
2 7
As with ideas of colonial trusteeship, those who advocate
understanding occupation as trusteeship explain the concept as a
reflection of an underlying objective to humanize the basis for and
the conduct of occupations. Occupation as trusteeship reflects the
policy objective that, as mentioned earlier, occupying powers do
not enjoy sovereignty over the territories concerned, and are to be
prevented from claiming such sovereignty through a prohibition to
this effect in occupation law.' The objective is promoted by
conceiving the relationship between the occupant and the
occupied territory as one of trusteeship; the notion of acting on
behalf of the beneficiary obliges the occupier to protect, not alter
(or claim for itself) the sovereignty of the occupant.29 Gerhard von
Glahn conceives occupation on a trusteeship basis on the grounds
that "the legitimate government of an occupied territory retains its
sovereignty," which is only "suspended in the area for the duration
of the belligerent occupation.""° Elaborating on this theme, Eyal
Benvenisti states:
The foundation upon which the entire law of occupation is
based is the principle of inalienability of sovereignty through
the actual or threatened use of force. Effective control by
foreign military force can never bring about by itself a valid
to be distinguished from occupation generally and, in consequence, certain obligations in
the law of occupation. See Gerson, Trustee Occupant, supra note 7; GERSON, ISRAEL, THE
WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, passim, and in particular, 78-82.
This notion that "trusteeship occupation" is somehow a distinct category of occupation is
not reflected in the generalized notions of trusteeship adopted by the commentators above
in the present footnote. Adam Roberts, in particular, makes the comments reproduced
above in the context of dismissing Gerson's notion and concludes by expressing skepticism
that "trusteeship occupation" is a "separate category of occupation." Roberts, What is
Military Occupation, supra note 7, at 295.
26. VON GLAHN, supra note 7, at 668.
27. BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 6 (footnote omitted which cites the works by
Wilson, von Glahn, and Roberts cited supra note 25 (in the case of von Glahn, Benvenisti
cites the same quote cited above contained in an earlier edition of the same work)).
28. On this, see text accompanying note 7 above at pp. 5-6.
29. On the notion of acting on behalf of the beneficiary, see the discussion above,
note 15. The significance of the trusteeship concept for issues of title in occupation law
discussed here underlines the observations therein about how the notion of "trust" from
domestic property law relates to the concept of international trusteeship.
30. VON GLAHN, supra note 7, at 668.
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transfer of sovereignty. From the principle of inalienable
sovereignty over a territory spring[s] the constraints that
international law imposes upon the occupant. The power
exercising effective control within another sovereign's territory
has only temporary managerial powers, for the period until a
peaceful solution is reached. During that limited period, the
occupant administers the territory on behalf of the sovereign.
Thus the occupant's status is conceived to be that of a trustee.
3
1
The central "humanizing" element of the occupation law
conception of trusteeship, then, is the objective of preventing
occupations from enabling occupiers from obtaining title through
force, echoing the reason why rule over the Mandated and Trust
territories was also conceived in this way. More broadly,
conceiving occupation as "trust" is an attempt to rein in the
impulse of occupying states to use the occupation to pursue self-
serving objectives.32 The "humanitarian" norms of occupation law,
concerned with protecting individuals and maintaining order, can
similarly be understood as a means of humanizing the conduct of
occupations, seeking to rule out, for example, abusive practices
such as sexual assault and rape, retributional attacks on civilians,
pillage, and the failure to restore order historically associated with
occupations. 3  The humanitarian explanation for the norms of
occupation law is further reinforced by the instrumental approach
of those who seek to define the factual test of "occupation," which,
if met,' triggers substantive obligations, in terms of activity that
they consider to require regulation by the obligation sthat would
be so triggered. "
31. BENVENISTI, supra note 7, at 5-6, footnote omitted (on the contents of the
omitted footnote, see above, note 27).
32. Discussing the rationale for occupation law, Eyal Benvenisti states that '... in the
heart of all occupations exists a potential-if not an inherent-conflict of interest between
occupant and occupied'; BENVENISTI, supra note 7, at 4.
33. On these norms, see the instruments and sources cited above note 7.
34. The factual definition of occupation in law is discussed above. See supra note 7.
Discussing "specific cases differing in some respect from the most classic forms of
occupation", Roberts states that there are nonetheless "some markers which may help to
indicate the existence of an occupation, or may suggest the need for the law on
occupations to be applied." Roberts, What is Military Occupation?, supra note 7, at 300. In
setting out these markers without explaining whether they are indicative in relation to
occupation as fact or occupation as the need for regulation-or both-the issues of how
occupation is defined factually so as to trigger occupation law, and what circumstances
require the norms of occupation law as a matter of principle, are elided. All the factors set
out can be understood to implicate the latter issue; for Roberts:
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E. The Twin Objectives of Trusteeship: Care and Improvement
The conception of occupation as trusteeship aimed at
safeguarding the status quo is at odds with how many occupations
have been conducted and, more broadly, how trusteeship as it
developed in the context of colonialism sometimes operated,
where transformation of the political and economic system of the
territories concerned was evident. Generally, in many instances of
trusteeship as defined here, the role of the trustee was understood
to have a two-part character: first, to care for the ward; and
second, to exercise tutelage of the ward to ensure that it can
mature and eventually care for itself. In the context of colonialism,
the idea of the "civilizing mission" was to govern in such a way as
to address the perceived incapacity for self-government (or at least
governance that met the standard of civilization) and also to build
up local capacities, sometimes with the goal of making self-
administration, meeting the standard, eventually possible. "
The general contours of this idea are evident in the earlier
quotation from the General Act of the Berlin Conference, with its
obligation to "watch over" and "care for... improvement."'16 In
(i) [T]here is a military force whose presence in a territory is not sanctioned or
regulated by a valid agreement, or whose activities there involve an extensive
range of contacts with the host society not adequately covered by the original
agreement under which it intervened; (ii) the military force has either displaced
the territory's ordinary system of public order and government, replacing it with
its own command structure, or else has shown the clear physical ability to
displace it; (iii) there is a difference of nationality and interest between the
inhabitants on the one hand and the forces intervening and exercising power
over them on the other, with the former not owing allegiance to the latter; (iv)
within an overall framework of a breach of important parts of the national or
international legal order, administration and the life of society have to continue
on some legal basis, and there is a practical need for an emergency set of rules to
reduce the dangers which can result from clashes between the military force and
the inhabitants. Id.
In what appears to be a similarly instrumental approach, Steven Ratner adopts a broad
definition of occupation, as "occupation in a functional sense to describe control of
territory by outside entities," Ratner, supra note 7, at 697.
35. See generally sources cited supra note 11. For Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and
Helen Tiffin, through the civilizing mission, "colonialism could be (re)presented as a
virtuous and necessary civilizing task involving education and paternalistic nurture."
ASHCROFT ET. AL., supra note 11, at 47. Anthony Anghie describes the civilizing mission
as the idea of "extending Empire for the higher purpose of educating and rescuing the
barbarian." ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, supra note 11, at 96. See also ibid., 96 et seq.;
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 11, at 145, 147, 168.
36. Berlin General Act, supra note 16, at ch. I, art. VI. In its 1923 parliamentary
White Paper on colonial rule in Kenya, the British Government stated that the 'object' of
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the same way, Article 22 of the League Covenant articulates the
"sacred trust of civilization" forming the basis for the Mandate
arrangements in terms of the "well-being and development" of the
people in Mandated territories. 3' The provisions of the UN
Charter concerning non-self-governing territories and Trust
territories are similarly concerned with ideas of both care and
advancement.38
F. Common Concept of Trusteeship
To summarize, the idea of humanizing the conduct of
occupation that is the underlying idea of occupation law can be
viewed as a species of the broader normative enterprise of
humanizing the conduct of foreign rule through the concept of
trusteeship. So in one sense the ideas underlying the Hague
conception of occupation built on ideas in the Berlin General Act,
and would later find expression in the Covenant and the Charter.
IV. How Do OCCUPATION AND TRUSTEESHIP RELATE TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION?
A. Trusteeship Characteristics
Where, then, does international territorial administration fit
into the general concept of trusteeship, and how does it relate to
occupation? ITA has occurred since the creation of the League of
Nations.39 Although the word trusteeship is not officially used in
relation to ITA, the activity it involves clearly manifests the central
elements of a trust relationship: a "ward" people placed under the
care of an international organization that performs administrative
functions understood as not being for its own gain but, rather, in
the ward's own interest, with the dual role of remedying perceived
incapacities for governance and transforming the situation so that
these incapacities no longer exist and the local population is able
to run its own affairs.' In East Timor, for example, the United
the trust exercised by the Crown in Kenya was the 'protection and advancement of the
native races. GR. BRIT. COLONIAL OFFICE, supra note 11, at 10.
37. On this, see further the dictum of the International Court of Justice in
International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. at 128, 131.
38. See U.N. Charter art. 73 (for Non-Self-Governing Territories); id. art. 76 (for
Trusteeship Territories).
39. On ITA generally, see WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2. On its history in particular, see id., ch. 2.
40. See id. passim, and in particular, ch. 6, 343-63 and sources cited therein.
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Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
was introduced on the basis that, in the short term, local people
were deemed incapable of self-administration, the objective being
to both provide governance and build up local capacities. " Despite
this, many commentators resist associating ITA with state-
conducted trusteeship and occupation.
B. Michael Bothe and Thilo Marauhn's "Security Council
Trusteeship Administration" Concept
The leading academic opponents of comparing ITA with
state-conducted trusteeship and occupation are Michael Bothe and
Thilo Marauhn. Bothe and Marauhn conceptualize UNMIK and
UNTAET as "Security Council trusteeship administration."42
Although they use the word "trusteeship," they resist any
comparison between their concept and state-conducted
trusteeship. In the first place, they state:
The concepts of occupation, protectorate and trusteeship as
such are ideologically still linked to particular political and
historical situations, related to traditional armed conflict or to
colonialism. Simply referring to or relying upon these concepts
may give rise to fears that the UN provides a forum for a new
form of "benevolent colonialism." 
43
What, however if one were not simply to refer to or rely upon
such concepts, but, rather, consider their potential significance in
detail? Should this not be done? And even if it should not, and a
simple reliance on such concepts led to the fears outlined, would
the fears necessarily be wrong as opposed to being unproven? The
passage continues:
41. See id. at 2-5, 2 n.2, 6 n.16, 9-11, 16-17, 20, 26, 32, 34 n.95, 39, 42 n.116, 43, 47, 55,
60, 75, 82-83, 93, 95, 100, 172, 183-89, 198, 206-07,213,222, 223 n.130, 225-31, 234, 251 n.45,
252, 255, 257, 259-61, 265, 272-74, 275-77, 287, 290, 292 n.12, 294-95, 298 n.31, 344-48, 349
n.240, 351, 359-62, 376 n.341, 379-80, 382-84, 405-07, 413, 419-20, 424-26, 427 n.553, 430,
439, 433, 441 n.l, 443, 448, 450, 452, sources cited therein, and the works listed id., in the
List of Sources, § 5.1.3 and the relevant parts of §5.1.1.
42. Michael Bothe & Thilo Marauhn, UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor:
Concept, Legality and Limitations of Security Council-Mandated Trusteeship
Administration, in KOSOVO AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: A LEGAL
ASSESSMENT 217 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 2002).
43. Id. at 218, footnote omitted.
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[I]n order to avoid such misconceptions it is necessary to take a
closer look at the context of the UN Security Council mandated
interim administrations in Kosovo and East Timor ......
Bothe and Mar auhn move to consider the two missions within
the taxonomy of peace operations exclusively. They conclude that
if one thinks about the missions "from the perspective of
peacekeeping and peace-building," then "the concept, legality and
limitations of such operations can be more easily discussed without
giving rise to concerns about neo-colonialism ... ,,"
So the authors identify the potential relevance of the colonial
analogy, but pull back from it immediately, choosing to try to find
a way of thinking about the missions other than through the
colonial comparator, via the "context" of the missions and the
"perspective" of peace operations. Why the classification of the
missions as peace operations somehow takes them out of the arena
of any meaningful comparisons with colonialism is unexplained.
More fundamentally, the authors seem to take as their premise a
need not to "give rise to concerns about neo-colonialism." But one
cannot avoid such concerns by failing to face up to them. Such an
approach is as limited as the approach they highlight of "simply
referring to or relying upon" colonial comparisons; it may be right,
it may be wrong, but its advocates have not provided any
substantive arguments to explain why they have adopted it.
Bothe's and Marauhn's attempt to situate UNMIK and
UNTAET within a broader policy framework avoids the colonial
comparator; the "trusteeship" in their notion of "Security Council
trusteeship administration" is based on an analogy from domestic
law concepts of trust in the area of property law, from which they
assert that "the establishment of a foreign presence in a
territory ... may be termed a trusteeship administration."
6
Addressing UNMIK and UNTAET, they conclude:
The concept of trusteeship seems applicable because such an
administration is exercised in the interest or on behalf of
another corporate body, the "old" or "new" sovereign and/or
the population of the territory. This other corporate body, in
the technical sense, can be considered to be the "cestui que
trust" or the "trustor" [beneficiary]. While there may be cases
44. Id.
45. Id. at 219.




in which it is difficult to identify the trustor and while there may
even be cases involving several trustors, this does not affect the
underlying concept as such. 17
Bearing in mind these observations in light of the earlier
review of international trusteeship herein, one might conclude
that, in acting in the way described by the authors, UNMIK and
UNTAET are nothing new and fit within the general idea of
international trusteeship as articulated, for example, by Edmund
Burke. However, Bothe and Marauhn take a different approach.
They argue that the two missions are merely "first steps" towards
"Security Council mandated trusteeship administration."
48
UNMIK and UNTAET constitute "modern trusteeship" and
"demonstrate the need to re-conceptualize the trust in public
international law., 49 The authors acknowledge the existence of
earlier ITA projects, but insist that:
None of these cases have, however, been extensively discussed
as an example for a modern trust under public international
law. Obviously, the simple fact that an international
organization assumes governmental powers does not seem to be
the decisive criterion for distinguishing such a modern trust [i.e.,
UNMIK and UNTAET] from other forms of second-generation
peacekeeping. 5
For Bothe and Marauhn, then, the mere fact that the
potential significance of trusteeship to these earlier projects has
not been "extensively discussed" means that it cannot exist. The
authors do not explain why this particular conclusion is chosen
over, say, the explanation that commentators missed the
significance of trusteeship. As with their earlier denial of the
relevance of colonialism by seeking to avoid an exploration of the
potential for such relevance, here the authors find evidence for the
idea that UNMIK and UNTAET as "trusteeships" are entirely
''new" simply from the absence of much discussion about the
relevance of trusteeship to the earlier ITA projects.
Bothe and Marauhn do offer substantive reasons for newness:
the projects are "unique" within UN territorial administration
missions because they have long-term objectives, they are acting
47. Bothe & Marauhn, supra note 42, at 220 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 222.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 223. For the discussion of the earlier projects, see id. at 220-21.
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"fully as interim governments" (meaning "their tasks go far beyond
the scope of past UN peacekeeping operations"), they have
plenary competence, and they cover territories which "form part of
another State and whose future status is not quite certain.""
Taking all this together, "the characteristic criterion"
distinguishing UNMIK and UNTAET "from other, more
traditional forms of peacekeeping, is that the UN in Kosovo and
East Timor has replaced the government of the State to which the
territory in question belongs in toto."52
One might dispute this picture of UNMIK and UNTAET as
exaggerated-what is to be said of the United Nations Temporary
Executive Authority in West Irian (UNTEA) in the 1960s and the
United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia,
Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in the 1990s? But,
assuming that, in some ways, the two missions can be considered
unique, what is served by treating them entirely separately from
other ITA missions, bearing in mind what is lost in terms of being
able to appreciate commonalities? 3 As the earlier exploration of
state-conducted forms of international trusteeship suggests, a
situation can be regarded as one of trust where some sort of
control by an outside actor is exercised ostensibly on behalf of the
local population, even if it does not manifest the scale and
ambition of the Kosovo and East Timor projects.
C. Do Trusteeship and Occupation Presuppose Imposition?
One other feature of the overall trusteeship concept that
might challenge the notion of a common policy institution is the
question of whether or not it presupposes that the arrangements
were considered to be imposed on the territories concerned. One
of the leading scholars of international trusteeship from the
discipline of international relations, William Bain, sees imposition
51. Id. at 224. Kosovo, during the UNMIK period, did indeed form part of a state (the
former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). See WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, ch. 4, sec. 4.5.3, and sources cited therein. East Timor,
however, did not form part of any state in the sense that another state enjoyed
sovereignty, meaning title, over it. See Id., ch. 5, section 5.7 and sources cited therein.
52. Bothe & Marauhn, supra note 42, at 224.
53. On this, see further the discussion in WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, at ch. 1, section 1.2.1. On UNTEA, see ibid., 4, 13, 43,
50-1, 50-1 n. 18, 60, 94, 153, 167-70, 188, 193, 195-6, 199, 205 n. 57, 233, 242, 245, 266 n. 98,
274, 278, 345, 380, 403-5, 437, 440; on UNTAES see ibid., 56, 58, 58 n. 37, 142 n. 202, 243.
[Vol. 31:85
Trusteeship and Self-Determination
as crucial to the general concept.' This is rooted, however, in
Bain's commitment to state sovereignty and sovereign equality;
trusteeship itself, as articulated by Edmund Burke for example,
does not denote imposition as an essential component. "
Nevertheless, does occupation under the international law of
occupation presuppose imposition, potentially placing into
question the meaningfulness of any collective treatment of
imposed and consensual arrangements of foreign territorial
control?
Given that imposed occupations are generally the result of
military force, the debate here intersects with the general issue
discussed earlier regarding whether the definition of occupation
only covers those situations that have their origins in warfare. 56
Certain scholars, including Eyal Benvenisti, consider the absence
of consent by the host sovereign entity to be a key element of the
definition of occupation." Others, including Adam Roberts,
consider both consensual and non-consensual occupations in their
treatment of the topic. 58 If occupation is understood to be limited
to "imposed" arrangements, then it cannot be understood to map
across the concept of trusteeship generally. "
Steven Ratner argues that occupation should be viewed as
covering both consensual and imposed arrangements.' As
mentioned above, Adam Roberts appears to endorse this view.
Whereas he speculates that the tendency of characterizations of
many of the peace operations since the end of the Cold War,
including certain ITA missions, not to use the term "occupation"
might be explained in part by the degree of consent that was
54. BAIN, supra note 11, at 149-54. See also the discussion in WILDE,
INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, at 346,53.
55. See the discussion in WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION,
supra note 2, at 346-53.
56. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
57. BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at 4 (Benvenisti's definition includes the requirement
that the control is exercised "without the volition of the sovereign of the territory"). See
also Vit6, supra note 7, at 14; U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 7, at 274-75.
58. See generally Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, supra note 7, passim, and
in particular, the view expressed therein at 249; Roberts, Transformative Military
Occupation, supra note 1, at 603 (the existence of formal consent does not render
impossible the applicability of the law of occupation).
59. So, for example, in setting out a definition of occupation that appears to exclude
arrangements involving consent, the UK Ministry of Defence invokes certain ITA projects
as examples of situations that would be excluded. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra
note 7, at 274-75.
60. Ratner, supra note 7, at 697-98.
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forthcoming in relation to them, he nonetheless affirms the
applicability of occupation law to consensual arrangements. 6' For
present purposes, this broader definition of occupation speaks to
the essential commonality concerning the structure of external
control that exists across occupation and all the other forms of
international trusteeship.
D. Does Occupation Only Cover State-Conducted Activity?
Steven Ratner's argument that the category of "occupation"
should be broad enough to cover both imposed and consensual
arrangements is made as part of a more general thesis advocating
the conceptualization of ITA Within the occupation paradigm.62
One approach to defining "occupation," which might seem to
contradict this is the idea that the term only covers activities by
states, and not those by international organizations.63 Clearly, the
law of occupation traditionally understood is so limited.' Perhaps
61. In a 1984 article, Roberts states that, if missions are operating on the basis of a
status of forces agreement With the host state, "they would not be in occupation of the
territory as the term has been traditionally used in international law. It is just conceivable,
however, that in different circumstances a peacekeeping force could find itself organizing
some kind of 'occupation by consent."' Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, supra
note 7, at 291 (citation omitted). Discussing when such different circumstances might
prevail, Roberts covers the scenario of state collapse, and cites ONUC in the Congo (one
of the early UN projects involving ITA) as an example. Roberts' consideration of these
issues in his later article Transformative Military Occupation (supra note 1), is at 603.
62. Ratner, supra note 7, passim.
63. Id. at 698.
64. On the law of occupation, see generally the sources cited supra note 6. On the
question of the applicability of the laws of war and the law of occupation generally to UN
peace operations, see The Secretariat of -the U.N., Question of the Possible Accession of
Intergovernmental Organizations to the" Geneva Conventions of the Protection of War
Victims, in 1972 U.N. JUR. Y.B. 153, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/10; Secretary-General's
Bulletin, The Secretary-General, Observance by the United Nations Forces of
International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999). For
academic commentary, see D.W. BOWETr, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY
OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE ch. 15 (1964); FINN SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS
FORCES IN.THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR ch. 3 (1966); R. KOLB, G. PORREIrO & S.
VITtz, L'APPLICATION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE ET DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME AUX ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES: FORCES DE PAIX" ET
ADMINISTRATIONS CIVILES INTERNATIONALES TRANSITOIRES (2003); Yves Sandoz,
The Application of Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the United Nations
Organization, 1978 18 (issue 206) INT'L REV. RED CROSS 245, 274; Dietrich Schindler,
United Nations Forces and International Humanitarian Law, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES 521 (Christophe
Swinarski ed., 1984); Umesh Palwankar, Applicability of International Humanitarian Law
to United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces, 33 (issue 294) INT'L REV. RED CROSS 227 (1993).
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because of this, some commentators have defined occupation itself
as being limited to the actions of states. 6
In the same way, some commentators seem to understand
occupation as always something following armed conflict, perhaps
reflecting the traditional Hague-era conception of occupation
discussed earlier. ' From this, it is sometimes suggested that the
main commonality between occupation and ITA relates only to
those ITA missions that come after conflict. 67 More broadly, for
many, the term "occupation" is pejorative, and is therefore resisted
as inappropriate for the ITA missions. 6
65. Roberts' general definition of occupation in a 1984 article is an activity involving
"the armed forces of a State exercising some kind of domination or authority over
inhabited territory." Roberts, What is Military Occupation?, supra note 7, at 300. But see
infra note 69 for comments on peacekeeping. In a later article, Roberts states that the
tendency in characterizations of post-Cold War interventions, including the ITA projects,
for the occupation label not to be used, might be explained in part because "the foreign
presence had a multinational character." Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation,
supra note 1, at 603-04. On the potential causal relationship between the restriction .of the
legal definition and 'the formulation adopted in more general definitions as far as the
state/international organization issue is concerned, see, e.g., Ratner, supra note 7, at 697.
For a discussion of the fit between the norms of occupation law and ITA, see the
discussion below, text accompanying note 104, et seq.
66. The earlier discussion is located in the text accompanying note 9, et seq..
67. Commentators considering the link between occupation and ITA include Ratner,
supra note 7; Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 1; BENVENISTI,
supra note 1, at xv-xvii; RICHARD CAPLAN, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF WAR-
TORN TERRITORIES: RULE AND RECONSTRUCTION 3-4 (2005); SIMON CHESTERMAN,
YOU, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS, AND
STATE BUILDING 6-7, 11-12, 145 (2004) [hereinafter CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE];
WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, Ch. 8, §§ 8.2.5,
8.3 and ch. 9, at 440-41. For example, when discussing occupation and ITA, Richard
Caplan states that "insofar as the two.., are initiated and sustained by force, they can...
be said to exhibit a strong family resemblance." CAPLAN, supra at 3.
68. Such resistance exists in the case of certain state occupations as well. Adam
Roberts identifies one "reason for reluctance to use the word 'occupation': the adverse
connotations of the word itself. To many, 'occupation' is almost synonymous with
aggression and oppression. Thus there has been widespread use of terms with a
supposedly better ring: protectorate, fraternal aid, rescue mission, technical incursion,
peacekeeping operation, military operation, civil administration, liberation and so on.
Sometimes these terms are used in addition to the term 'occupation,' in order to qualify it,
to highlight the special features of a situation, and to clarify the purpose of the military
action in question. Sometimes, and perhaps more often, these terms are used in total
substitution for 'occupation.' Occasionally there may be some merit in not classifying a
situation as an occupation: the maintenance of a fiction that a country retains its
independence may act as a lever for gradually reasserting independence as a fact."
Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, supra note 7, at 301. Steven Ratner makes this
point in relation to ITA missions in particular. See Ratner, supra note 7, at 696-97.
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However, if one wishes to foreground, not avoid, normative
implications, whether or not they are pejorative, the activity of
state-conducted occupation does bear important similarities with
ITA; it is more helpful to emphasize the similarities, rather than
the differences, between the two. As Steven Ratner states,
"[b]oth missions can resemble each other in the eyes of those living
in the occupied or administered territory,"70 and as Richard Caplan
states, "many of the challenges between the two may be
similar. . . ." " Ratner argues:
[T]he disconnect between the ways international law and
organizations have conceptualized occupations and territorial
administrations and the ways these missions are actually carried
out-is no longer tenable. In fact, the two sorts of operations
share a great deal, and lines separating them, adopted by
international elites and reflected in international law, are
disappearing. Although numerous works have examined state
occupations or international administrations separately, my
claim here is that only an understanding of them together will
enable both lawyers and policy-makers to develop optimal
72doctrine and operating procedures ....
So Ratner chooses to define occupation broadly, as "control
of territory by outside entities."73 As the final part of the longer
quotation above indicates, the objective is to develop a taxonomy
of interventions in order to be able to compare like with like on
69. For examples of commentators who define occupation to include the actions of
international organizations, see, e.g.,BENVENISTI, supra note 1; Vit6, supra note 7, Ratner,
supra note 7, passim. Although, as mentioned, Adam Roberts' general definition of
occupation in 1984 was exclusive to state occupations, his discussion of peacekeeping
generally, and the role of ONUC in the Congo in particular, suggests an acknowledgement
of the connections between state-conducted occupations and what was the first UN-
conducted ITA project:
"[I]f central authority in the host State were to collapse, a peacekeeping force
might find itself extending its authority and taking full charge of such matters as
public order and safety. The situation in the Congo during the United Nations
operation in 1960-4 affords one example illustrating the possibility of a United
Nations peacekeeping force finding itself in a role closely analogous to that of an
occupant .... Congolese political developments made it unclear for a time who
was the constitutional government, and there was United Nations intervention in
administrative activities and in internal conflict beyond what had originally been
envisaged."
Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, supra note 7, at 291 (footnote omitted).
70. Ratner, sutpra note 7, at 696.
71. CAPLAN, supra note 67, at 3.




two normative/operational issues: the legal framework and the
legitimacy of coercion used during such missions.7" The analysis
offered earlier in the present piece suggests that such a taxonomy
also has broader utility in emphasizing the commonality that exists
in terms of the nature of the activity performed and the policies
with which it is associated.
E. Holistic Category of "Trusteeship" Encompassing Colonialism,
Occupation and International Territorial Administration
Although considerable resistance exists among commentators
and in public discourse generally to drawing parallels between
colonialism and occupation, on the one hand, and international
territorial administration, on the other, if one focuses simply on
the underlying enterprise being engaged in, as opposed to
differences ascribed to the normative character of the
administering actors involved, the trusteeship concept illuminates
a commonality across foreign territorial administration generally.
This commonality has been more apparent to expert
commentators in the past than it seems to be to observers at
present. " Writing in 1939, Quincy Wright stated that the League of
Nations' administrative activities in Danzig and the Saar were
"analogous" to the Mandate system.76 Discussing the League
administration in the Saar and the Mandate arrangements, H.
Duncan Hall asserted in 1948:
What matters is the substance and not the form. The Saar
Territory was under the Saar Governing Commission and not
the Permanent Mandates Commission.. . such differences are
7largely a matter of the internal economy of the League ....
74. See id., passim.
75. On the popular resistance to drawing these comparisons, see the discussion in
WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, ch. 8, section
8.1.
76. See WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 101. On the League of Nations administrative
activities in the Free City of Danzig, see WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, at 11, 26, 49, 49 n.12, 60, 94, 111,114, 114 n.30, 116, 121-
28, 148-50, 213-14, 216, 227-28, 233-34, 244-45, 248, 274, 276 n.147, 287, 300, 343, 365, 370,
376. On the League administration of the Saar territory, see id. at 11, 26, 42, 49, 49 n.13,
56, 60, 94, 108, 111-14, 128, 148, 150, 155, 193, 196-67, 199-202, 208, 210, 212, 216, 218-19,
225, 227, 229, 233, 241-48, 265-69, 274-76, 343-44 n.217, 365, 370-71, 376.
77. HALL, MANDATES, supra note 17, at 11. Indeed, the provisions in the Treaty of
Versailles that created the Saar arrangements utilized the trust concept: "Germany
renounces in favour of the League of Nations, in the capacity of trustee, the government
of the territory." Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers of Germany
2009]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Discussing in 1975 the character of the administrative
mandate given to the UN Council for South West Africa/Namibia,
Itse Sagay stated:
[T]he legal status of the United Nations is that of a trustee,
rather than a sovereign. Its political relationship with the
mandated territory is that between an administrative authority,
or a de jure government and a territory under its rule. From the
point of view of the extent of powers and authority, there is no
difference between the position of the United Nations in South
West Africa, and a sovereign authority in its own territory.
However, fundamental and decisive differences exist with
regard to the aims and the goal of the United Nations in the
Territory, and its corresponding obligations, and the aims and
goal of a sovereign authority in its own territory. In the first
place, the United Nations' administration is carried out
primarily in the interest and for the benefit of the inhabitants of
the Territory; an indispensable element of a trust regime. A
sovereign authority in its own territory, on the other hand, rules
primarily for its own benefit, or could do so lawfully, while the
United Nations cannot. Moreover one of the specific and
fundamental obligations of the United Nations is to prepare the
mandated territory for immediate independence. In the case of
a sovereign authority, the position is the same where a colony is
concerned. If, however, the territory concerned is its home
territory the question of independence would not even arise. 78
In foregrounding the idea that administration is performed by
an external actor "primarily in the interest and for the benefits of
the inhabitants of the Territory," Sagay reflects the general way in
which this activity has been understood by those involved in it. In
describing the activity in question in terms of trusteeship, Sagay's
approach suggests a common link between colonial trusteeship,
the Mandate and Trusteeship arrangements, the concept of
occupation trusteeship, and ITA. All of' these practices can be
regarded as species of a common institution, "international
trusteeship." The reasons that give rise to these arrangements, the
art. 49, June 28, 1919, reprinted in 13 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 151, 167 (1919). For further
discussion, see WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2,
at 112 n.18.
78. SAGAY, supra note 20, at 268-69. See also id. at 271. On the UN Council for
South West Africa and Namibia, see WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, at 21 n.63, 50-1, 51 n.19, 94, 97, 153, 165 n.48, 170-72, 188,
205-06, 205 n.57, 208, 212-13, 216, 226-27, 233, 245, 249, 344, 360, 364, 377, 379-80.
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way the arrangements operate and seek to alter the political and
economic regime in the territories concerned, and the extent to
which attempts are made to improve local capacities may differ
significantly between them, but the central conception of alien
actors exercising administrative control ostensibly on behalf of the
people of the territories is the same."
Many of the general areas of policy promoted in the context
of state-conducted trusteeship are reflected in the purposes and
policies of ITA.0 For instance, colonial-era policies of population
transfers"1 resonate with the use of ITA to enable migration policy,
such as the work of the Office of the High Representative (OHR)
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in using property legislation as a way
of enabling the transfer of displaced persons to their pre-war
homes.8 2 Similarly, the colonial model of legislative reform,
whereby local laws were altered if they were incompatible with the
"standard of civilization,"" was adopted by UNMIK in Kosovo
and UNTAET in East Timor. The two missions determined from
the outset the applicable law in the territories subjected to their
administration, accepting that existing law was to be applicable
only insofar as it was compatible with the standards of
international human rights law; in the case of East Timor, this
general test was supplemented with the repeal of certain expressly
stipulated laws.' Obviously, in some ways ITA does not replicate
79. Eyal Benvenisti states that UNTAET and UNMIK are "trusteeship of the kind
the law of occupation is designed to address." BENVENISTI, supra note 1, at xvi. See also
the discussion in Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 1.
80. See generally WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra
note 2, at chs. 6-7 (on the purposes-and policies associated with ITA); id. §§ 8.3.1-8.3.2 (on
the purposes and policies associated with other forms of foreign territorial administration).
81. See generally Catriona Drew, Population Transfer: The Untold Story of the
International Law of Self-Determination ch. 2 (Oct. 4, 2006) (unpublished Doctoral thesis,
London School of Economics) (on file with Senate House Library, University of London).
82. On OHR generally, see WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, at 9 n.28, 15-16, 18, 28, 32 n.88, 35-36, 42, 45, 48 n.6, 60,
64-69, 64-65 n.60, 66 n.66, 68 n.70, 70-72, 75, 80-82, 91-94, 108, 135, 138-39; 141, 144, 149-50,
204 n.47, 208-11, 213-17, 219-20, 222-24, 227-28, 230 n.143, 231-32, 234, 244-46, 249-50, 255
n.57, 256, 259, 261, 265, 272-73, 276, 278, 282-86, 290-91, 293-94, 301, 312, 346-50, 352, 353
nn.251-52, 359-60, 382-83, 404-05, 412, 426, 428, 430, 436, 446-47, 449, 451, 455 On this
particular activity concerning property. legislation, see id. at 220 n.115-235.
83. See ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, supra note 11, at 169 text accompanying n.208.
84. On UNMIK generally, see sources cited supra note 3. On UNTAET, see the
sources cited supra note 41. On the issue of determining applicable law at the onset of the
missions, in the case of UNMIK, see UNMIK Reg. 1999/1, July 25, 1999, sec. 2-3
(UNMIK), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/index.htm.
For UNTAET, see UNTAET Reg. 1999/1, Nov, 27, 1999, sec. 2-3 (UNTAET), available at
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the colonial paradigm, for example, in not facilitating the direct
extraction of human resources (the exploitation of material
resources, however, has sometimes been a feature of ITA). ' In the
general mode of operation, however (the use of territorial control
to pursue certain polices concerning the nature of governance),
there is a clear link, and in many of the substantive policies similar
ideas are in play.
To bring together the foregoing analysis on the relationship
between occupation, colonial trusteeship, the Mandate and
Trusteeship arrangements, and ITA, one might say that there is a
general institution in international public policy that can be termed
"international trusteeship." This policy institution covers a
relationship of administrative control by an international actor or a
group of such actors (whether states or international
organizations) over a territorial unit. The identity of these
territorial units is understood as something 'other' than that of the
administering actor or actors, in most cases because of the lack of
title. This relationship of administrative control is conceptualized
in terms of the administering actor or actors performing the
administrative role on behalf of the administered territory.
How should the issue of rights and obligations in the various
manifestations of international trusteeship be understood? And
what is the significance to this inquiry of considering the various
practices holistically as- trusteeship? This inquiry is pursued in the
following four sections. First, the general questions that need to be
resolved in order to determine what law does apply are set out.
Second, general issues relating to the question of what law should
http://www.un.org/peace/etimorlUntaetN.htm. On UNMIK, see also The Secretary-
General, Reportof the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. Sf19991779 (July 12, 1999). In Kosovo, these provisions were
subsequently altered to accommodate the view held locally that the law adopted after
March 1989, when Kosovo's autonomy was revoked, should not apply at all. See UNMIK
Reg. 1999/24, Dec 12, 1999, as amended by UNMIK Reg. 2000/59, Oct 27, 2000 (UNMIK),
available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg24-99.htm. For commentary,
see, e.g., Nathaniel Berman, Intervention in a "Divided World": Axes of Legitimacy, 17
EUR. J. INT'L L. 769 (2006).
.85. Roland Paris similarly affirms a general connection, while acknowledging certain
differences, between colonialism and peacebuilding missions. See Roland Paris,
International Peacebuilding and the Mission Civilisatrice, 28 REV. INT'L STUD. 635, 652
(2002). On the exploitation of natural resources in the context of ITA missions, see
WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, at 225. A
further key idea of distinction is the notion that ITA is understood to be "humanitarian,"
not "exploitative." See id. at 384-428 . This is considered briefly infra, text accompanying
note 150.
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apply are considered. Third, this piece addresses what the law
should be, considering the specific issue of accountability, and the
relevance of the trusteeship concept to this issue. Finally, in the
fourth stage the significance of the self-determination entitlement
to this general inquiry is reviewed.
V. APPLICABLE LAW-WHAT LAW DOES APPLY?
A. General Issues
Although the nature of the activity across the different
manifestations of trusteeship shares a certain elemental
commonality, the applicable normative regime is, of course, highly
variated. One axis of variety is the different obligations that can
operate as between different international legal persons. For
example, during the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
occupation of Iraq, the United Kingdom was bound under its
international obligations not to enable the death penalty in Iraq,
but the United States was under no such international obligation.6
The difference is acute when state-conducted trusteeship is
compared with the same activity conducted by international
organizations, since these entities are not bound in their own right
to international treaties on occupation law or human rights. '
Another axis of variety across individual manifestations of
trusteeship concerns whether or not the Security Council is
86. The UK is a party to regional and global instruments imposing the obligation to
abolish the death penalty. See Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death
Penalty, Apr. 28, 1983, C. Europ. T.S. No. 114 (ratified by the United Kingdom on May
20, 1999); Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All
Circumstances, May 3, 2002; C. Europ. T.S. No. 187 (ratified by the U.K. on Oct. 10, 2003,
available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=187&CV=1&NA=
&PO=999&CN=999&VL=1&CM=9&CL=ENG); Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the
Death Penalty, Dec. 15, 1989, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414 (ratified by the U.K. on Dec. 10, 1999,
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, available at
http://www.ohchr.org). The United States is not party to equivalent treaty obligations. The
question of whether these obligations, if binding, apply extraterritorially is considered
infra Part V.B, "Human Rights Law in Particular: Whether and How it Applies
Extraterritorially."
87. On the issue of the application of the laws of war and the law of occupation
generally to international organizations, see supra Part IV.D, "Does Occupation Only
Cover State-Conducted Activity?".
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involved in ostensibly providing additional authority and
competence to the administering authorities, an issue with
potential relevance to both applicable law and the question of
legal responsibility.' The legal significance of this authority, when
it is forthcoming, in terms of applicable law, implicates a further,
broader issue of how the relationship between potentially
overlapping regimes of law is understood and mediated. Here,
account needs to be given to the special modalities that exist in
international law addressing the situation of a multiplicity of
applicable legal regimes. Notably, Article 103 of the UN Charter,
as far as Security Council-authorized action is concerned; the
related idea of other obligations enjoying jus cogens or peremptory
status; and the lex specialis status that international humanitarian
law and occupation law have in armed conflict and occupation
contexts respectively."9
88. See R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Sec'y of State for Def., ([2007] UKHL
58, [2008] 1 A.C. 332 ; Joined Cases, Behrami & Behrami v. France & Saramati v. France,
Germany & Norway, Appl. Nos 71412/01 and 78166/01, May 31, 2007, Europ. Ct. H.R.
(2007), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select
Decisions; search Case Title "Behrami").
89. On the interplay with Security Council authority, see the decisions of the
European Court of First Instance in Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of
the European Union & Comm'n of the European Cmties., 2005 E.C.R. 11-03649; Case T-
306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf & Al Barakaat Int'l Found. v. Council of the European Union
& Comm'n of the European Cmties., 2005 E.C.R. 11-03533; Case C-402/05, Kadi v.
Council & Comm'n, 2008 E.C.R. (Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro). See
also R (on the application of Al Jedda), [2007] UKHL 58; Behrami, Europ. Ct. H.R. On.
the application of human rights law to armed conflict and the interplay between human
rights law and the law of armed conflict and occupation law, see Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Reports 226, 25 (July 8) (Advisory Opinion); Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004
I.C.J. Reports 136, $$ 104-13 (July 9) (Advisory Opinion) [hereinafter Legal
Consequences of the Wall]; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. Reports 168, $ 216 (Dec. 19). On the relationship between
humanitarian law and international human rights law, see also U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), General Comment No. 31
on Article 2, Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the
Covenant, $1$ 10-11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/Rev.6 (Apr. 21, 2004), available at
http://hei.unige.ch/-clapham/hrdoc/docs/hrcGC31.htm [hereinafter General Comment No.
31 on Article 2]; Coard v. U.S., Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.109/99,
OEA/Ser.L.N/II.85, doc. 9 rev. $$ 1-4, 39 (1999); Salas and Others v. U.S., Case 10.573,
Inter-Am C.H.R., Report No. 31/93, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.85, doc. 9 rev. (1993); RENE
PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW (2002);
DANIEL WARNER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE QUEST FOR
UNIVERSALITY 107-23 (1997); L. Doswald-Beck and S. Vit6, International Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights Law, 293 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 94 (1994); J. A. Frowein, The
Relationship Between Human Rights Regimes and Regimes of Belligerent Occupation, 28
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In seeking to interpret the relevant applicable treaties, the
standard methodological choice between an originalist and
teleological approach has to be made. To give the example of a
human rights treaty, the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), is one to look only at the original purpose of the
Convention on an issue, whatever that-might be, as the European
Court of Human Rights appeared to in the Bankovi6 case
concerning the potential applicability of the treaty in the context
of the NATO bombing of what was then called the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999?o Or, alternatively, must one also
take on board the notion of the treaty articulated in the Tyrer case
as a "living instrument, which.., must be interpreted in the light
of present-day conditions," a dictum which, although not made in
the context of an extraterritorial situation, is regarded as a general
principle of Convention interpretation?
ISR. Y.B. H.R. 1 (1998); F. Hampson, Using International Human Rights Machinery to
Enforce the International Law of Armed Conflicts, 31 REVUE DE DROIT PINAL
MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 119 (1992) (BeIg.); 50th Anniversary of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Human Rights and International Humanitarian
Law, 324 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS (1998). On the relationship between different
areas of law more generally, see U.N. International Law Commission, Fragmentation of
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti
Koskenniemi); Rosalyn Higgins, Keynote Speech, A Babel of Judicial Voices?
Ruminations from the Bench, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 791, 791 (2006); David Kennedy,
One, Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan Dream,
Remarks Paper delivered at the Spring Meeting of the International Law Association,
British Branch (Mar. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/dkennedy/speeches/LegalOrders.pdf.
90. Bankovi6 v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.
63-5 (Grand Chamber), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select
HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case Title "Bankovi&").
91. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 585672, 26 Eur. Ct. H:R. (ser. A, No. 26)
31 (1978), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select
Decisions; search Case Title "Tyrer"); See also Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No.
14038/88, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A, No. 161) 102 (1989), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case
Title "Soering"); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A, No. 45) (1981) available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC;
select Decisions; search Case Title "Dudgeon"); X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom, 1997-II
Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law;
select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case Title "X,Y and Z").; V. v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 24888/94, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 72, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select
case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case Title "V"); Matthews v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 24833/94, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 39, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case
Title "Matthews"); Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 39
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And what is the relevance of state practice to the enquiry?
Again in the Bankovi6 case, the European Court of Human Rights
cited the general lack of derogations entered by states in relation
to certain foreign activities as somehow being indicative of a view
taken by them that treaty obligations did not apply
extraterritorially to the activities in question. Drawing such a
conclusion simply from this evidence is, however, difficult. It may
well be that the states concerned did not consider their obligations
under the Convention to apply for reasons other than the foreign
locus of the acts in question. For instance, in situations of armed
conflict, those states could have took the view that the Convention
had somehow been overridden by humanitarian law, as the lex
specialis applicable in the circumstances. Or, perhaps, officials had
simply not considered the issue, especially if the activity in
question was short-lived. It might even be speculated that states
took the view that the requirement of a declaration of derogation
meant something different in the foreign context, with perhaps,
when it was forthcoming, the existence of an international
mandate for their foreign operations somehow regarded as
constituting an implicit activation of the derogation regime
without the need for an explicit statement to this effect.
B. Human Rights Law in Particular: Whether and How it Applies
Extraterritorially
Considering the extraterritorial application of human rights
law in more detail, some of the states that would be subject to the
law here because of their engagement in extraterritorial activity
make various arguments refuting applicability. For example, a
secret memo prepared for the United States Department of
Defense in March 2003, reported that the United States has
"maintained consistently" that the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) "does not apply [to the U.S.] outside
the United States or its special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction, and.., does not apply to operations of the military
during an international armed conflict."'93
(1995) (preliminary objections), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law;
select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case Title "Loizidou").
92. Bankovi6, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 62.
93. U.S. Dep't of Def., Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the
Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational
Considerations 6 (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/
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Here, then, are two suggestions of non-applicability. Treating
them in reverse order, first is a suggestion concerning subject-
matter: human rights law does not apply in situations of armed
conflict. This contention implies that the laws of war and human
rights law are mutually exclusive in terms of the situations in which
they apply. When one area of law is in play, the other is not. The
laws of war apply only in times of "war" and, in the case of
occupation law, military occupation; human rights law applies only
in times of "peace."
Whereas the first contention is correct, ' the second is difficult
to sustain given the affirmation of applicability by several
authoritative sources, including the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in the Nuclear Weapons and Wall Advisory Opinions and the
DRC v. Uganda case.95 A typical affirmation of the applicability of
human rights law in times of "war" comes from the decision of the
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in the Coard case
of 1999, which concerned the detention of seventeen individuals by
d20040622doc8.pdf. Denials of extraterritorial applicability of the ICCPR (see infra note
99) and the Convention against Torture (see infra note 99) have been made officially. In its
statement before the UN Human Rights Committee in 2006, the United States reiterated
its "long-standing view.., that the Covenant by its very terms does not apply outside of
the territory of a State Party." Matthew Waxman, Head of U.S. Delegation, Principal
Deputy Dir. of Policy Planning, Dep't of State, Opening Statement Before the Human
Rights Committee (July 17, 2006), available at
http://geneva.usmission.gov/0717Waxman.html.. The U.S. position on the ICCPR is
detailed in U.N. Human Rights Comm.. Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the
Covenant- Third Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2003: United States of America,
U.N. Doc. CCCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005), Annex I, Territorial Scope of Application of
the Covenant.. According to the U.N. Committee Against Torture, an equivalent position
in relation to the CAT was articulated by the United States in deliberations before them in
2006, where the United States took the view that provisions in the CAT applicable to the
"territory under the [State Party's] jurisdiction" were "geographically limited to its own de
jure territory." U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations:
United States of America, 15, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/
e2d4f5b2dcccOa4ccl257leeOO290ceO/$FILE/G0643225.pdf [hereinafter CAT Consideration
of USA Report].
94. On the scope of application of the law of occupation, see supra note 7.
95. On the applicability of international human rights law in times of armed conflict,
see the relevant sources,'including the ICJ decisions mentioned, cited supra note 89. See
also the provisions, cases and commentary relating to derogations in human rights treaties
cited infra note 122.
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U.S. military forces during the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada.'
The Commission stated that:
[W]hile international humanitarian law pertains primarily in
times of war-and the international law of human rights applies
most fully in times of peace, the potential application of one
does not necessarily exclude or displace the other. There is an
integral linkage between the law of human rights and
humanitarian law because they share a "common nucleus of
non-derogable rights and a common purpose of protecting
human life and dignity," and there may be a substantial overlap
in the application of these bodies of law. Certain core
guarantees apply in all -circumstances, including situations of
conflict. 97
Even if, then, human rights law can apply in armed conflict
situations, what is to be made of the other supposed contention,
that it doesn't apply extraterritorially? The main human rights
treaties on civil and political rights do not conceive state
responsibility simply in terms of the acts of states parties. Such
'free standing' appplicability is the case, for example, in common
Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, in which contracting
parties "undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present
Convention in all circumstances." 98 Instead, responsibility is
conceived in a particular context: the state is obliged to secure the
rights contained in the treaty only within its jurisdiction." Thus a
nexus to the state-termed jurisdiction-has to be established
before the state act or omission can give rise to responsibility.
The consistent jurisprudence of the relevant international
review mechanisms and the ICJ has been to interpret jurisdiction
96. Coard v. U.S., Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.109/99,
OEA/Ser.L./VII.85, doc. 9 rev. 1$ 1-4 (1999).
97. Id. 39 (citations omitted).
98. Geneva Conventions I-IV, supra note 7, at art. 1.
99. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 95, at art. 2; Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, supra
note 95, at art. 1; ECHR, supra note 95, at art. 1; Am. Convention, supra note 95, at art. 1;
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 2, Nov. 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, [hereinafter Convention Against
Torture]. Some obligations are limited to the state's territory. See, e.g., Protocol No. 4 to
the European Convention on Human Rights art. 3, Sept. 16, 1963, Europ. T.S. No 46.
Note that the ECHR and its Protocols have separate provisions on applicability to
overseas territories. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 95, at art. 56.
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as operating extraterritorially in certain circumstances. ' o A
blanket denial of extraterritorial applicability is very difficult to
100. Legal Consequences of the Wall, supra note 89, $$ 107-113; Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo, supra note 89, 216; General Comment No. 31 on Article 2,
supra note 89, $ 10; Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.12/52, H.R. Comm.,
Supp. No. 40, at 176, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (July 29, 1981), $ 12.3; Celiberti de Casariego v.
Uruguay, Communication No. R.13/56, H.R. Comm., Supp No. 40, at 185, U.N. Doc.
A/36/40 (July 29, 1981), 10.3; Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, (No. 12747/87),
14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 745 (1992), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select
HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case Title "Drozd"); Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No.
15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 39 (1995) (preliminary objections), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case
Title "Loizidou") Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. $ 52-56
(merits), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select
Decisions; search Case Title "Loizidou");Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, 2001-IV
Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber) 77, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law;
select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case Title "Cyprus" and "Turkey"); Issa and
Others v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. $$ 69-71, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law: select HUDOC; search "Issa"); Ilascu and
Others v. Moldova and Russia, App. No. 48787/99, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. $ 314-16,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions;
search Case Title "Ilascu'); Solomou v. Turkey, App. No. 36832/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. I$ 43-
52 (2008), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; search
"Solomou"); CAT Consideration of USA Report, supra note 93, 15. The ICCPR
provision on applicability, by including the word "territory," might be read to suggest that
jurisdiction is limited to territory, thereby ruling out extraterritorial applicability. This
position is difficult to sustain given .the affirmation of extraterritorial applicability by the
ICJ and the Human Rights Committee in the cases mentioned in the previous sentence.
For academic commentary on extraterritorial applicability generally see, e.g., Christopher
Lush, The Territorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights: Recent
Case Law, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 897. 897 (1993); Theodor Meron, Extraterritoriality of
Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, (1995); Frowein, supra note 89; PASQUALE
DE SENA, LA NoZIONE DI GIURISDIZIONE STATALE NEi TRATrATI SUI DIRIT7I
DELL'UOMO [THE CONCEPT OF STATE JURISDICTION IN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES]
(Torino: G. Giappichelli, 2002); Orna Ben-Naftali & Yuval Shany, Living in Denial: The
Application of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 37 ISR. L. REV. 17 (2003);
Matthew Happold, Bankovid v. Belgium and the Territorial Scope of the European
Convention of Human Rights, 3 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 77 (2003); Alexander Orakhelashvili,
Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the Recent Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 529, 529 (2003); Kerem Altiparmak,
Bankovi6: An Obstacle to the Application of the European Convention on Human Rights in
Iraq?, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 213, 213 (2004); Kenneth Watkin; Controlling the
Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 98 AM.
J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2004); EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
(Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004); Silvia Borelli, Casting Light on the
Legal Black Hole: International Law and Detentions Abroad in the 'War on Terror', 857
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 39, 270 (2005); available at
http://www.icrc.orgfWeb/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/review-857-p39/$File/
irrc_857.Borelli.pdf; Fox, supra note 1, at 270-78; M.J. Dennis, Application of Human
Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99
AM. J. INT'L L. 119, 119 (2005); Olivier De Schutter, Globalization and Jurisdiction:
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 31:85
sustain in the face of this extensive authority. In the jurisprudence
and other authoritative interpretations, the key question has not
been whether human rights law treaty obligations apply
extraterritorially, but, rather, in what circumstances this happens.
The term "jurisdiction" has been understood in the extraterritorial
context in terms of the existence of a connection between the state
and either the territory in which the relevant acts took place-a
spatial connection-or the individual affected by them-a personal
connection. ' Within these two categories, however, there is
Lessons from the European Convention on Human Rights (N.Y.U. Sch. of L. Center for
H.R. and Global Just., Working Paper No. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.chrgj.org/publications/docs/wp/
DeSchutter%20Globalization%20and%20Jurisdiction.pdf; Michal Gondek,
Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights: Territorial
Focus in the Age of Globalization?, 52 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 349, 349 (2005); Ralph Wilde,
Casting Light on the 'Legal Black Hole': Some Political Issues at Stake, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 552 (2006) [hereinafter Wilde, Casting Light on the 'Legal Black Hole']; Ralph
Wilde, Legal "Black Hole"? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on
Civil and Political Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 739 (2005) [hereinafter Wilde, Legal "Black
Hole"?]; Ralph Wilde, The 'Legal Space' or 'Espace Juridique' of the European
Convention on Human Rights: Is It Relevant to Extraterritorial State Action?, 2 EUR. HUM.
RTs. L. REV. 115 Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 1; Wilde,
Casting Light on the 'Legal Black Hole', supra; M.J. Dennis, Non-Application of Civil and
Political Rights Treaties Extraterritorially During Times of International Armed Conflict, 40
ISR. L. REV. 453, 453 (2007); Dominic McGoldrick, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
in the UK Courts, 40 ISR. L. REV. 527, 527 (2007); Gerry Simpson, The Death of Baha
Mousa, 8 MELB. J. OF INT'L L. 340, 340 (2007); Ralph Wilde, Triggering State Obligations
Extraterritorially: The Spatial Test in Certain Human Rights Treaties, 40 ISR. L. REV. 503,
503 (2007); Tobias Thienel, The ECHR in Iraq: The Judgment of the House of Lords in R
(Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence, 6 J. OF INT'L CRIM. JUST. 115, 115 (2008);
Ralph Wilde, R (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence: The Redress Trust
Intervening, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 628 (2008) [hereinafter Wilde, Al-Skeini]; Ralph Wilde,
Complementing Occupation Law?: Selective Judicial Treatment of the Suitability of Human
Rights Norms, 42 ISR. L. REV. 80 [hereinafter Wilde, Complementing Occupation Law].
101. On the "spatial" connection, see, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Wall, 2004 I.C.J.
Reports 107-113; General Comment No. 31 on Article 2, supra note 89, 1
10;Loizidou,1996-Vt Eur. Ct. H.R. IT 52, 62; Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. IT
75-77; Bankovid v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII, Eur. Ct. H.R. 70, 75,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions;
search Case Title "Bankovid"); Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. I
69-70, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; search "Issa v.
Turkey"); Ilascu v. Moldova, App. No. 48787/99, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. IT 314-16,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions;
search Case Title "Ilascu"); CAT Consideration of USA Report, supra note 93, 15. On
the "personal connection", see General Comment No. 31 on Article 2, supra note 89, 1 10;
Lopez Burgos, H.R. Comm., Supp. No. 40, at 176, supra note 100, 12.3; Bankovie, 2001-
XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 75; Issa, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 71; Solomou, Eur. Ct. H.R. $ 45, 50-51;
CAT Consideration of USA Report, supra note 93, 15. For commentary, see the
academic sources cited supra note 100.
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considerable uncertainty due to the sparse nature of case law and a
variety of views taken by states and expert commentators. 12
Assuming that it has been determined how, if at all, the
meaning of human rights law has been mediated through the
interplay of this area of law with other applicable legal regimes, it
is then necessary to determine what human rights law
substantively amounts to in the extraterritorial context. All things
being equal; does human rights law require the state to do, or not
do, the same things in foreign territory as it does in its own
sovereign territory? A relevant factor to consider is the profoundly
different political basis for the state administrative presence,
where it is acting as a foreign occupier rather than as the
sovereign, as highlighted in the quote by Itse Sagay earlier. Should
the nature of the control exercised by the state somehow mediate
the scope of its obligations? Should it matter that the state is not
able to influence what happens in the foreign territory to the same
extent as it can in its own territory? How might actions that might
be considered justified by the special circumstances of insecurity
and conflict that often prevail in the extraterritorial locus, for
example security detentions, fit within what is permissible in
human rights law?
These and other issues feed into the question of what rights
themselves mean in the occupation context, and. how derogation
provisions might be understood, including the requirement in the
trigger for such provisions that an emergency "threatens the life of
the nation." In the particular context of the ECHR, might the
''margin of appreciation," whereby deference is given to a state's
own determination of the permissibility of restricting rights, have
special relevance in the extraterritorial context? 103
102. For case law and commentary, see the sources listed supra notes 99, 101.
103. On the margin of appreciation, see, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No.
549372, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-
law; select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case Title "Handyside"); Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 94, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law;
select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case Title "Dudgeon"); Christine Goodwin v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (Grand Chamber),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions;
search Case Title "Goodwin"). For criticism, see Susan Marks, Civil Liberties at the
Margin: The U.K. Derogation and the European Court of Human Rights, 15 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 69 (1996).
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VI. APPLICABLE LAW-WHAT LAW SHOULD APPLY?
A. Why Consider This Question
Any consideration of applicable law also needs to account for
the debates regarding whether the law should apply. It might be
suggested, by way of criticism, that to consider such a question is
to discuss the law as it should be rather than the law as it is. But
legitimate forms of intellectual inquiry.on the law should not be
limited to the law as it is. It is crucial to critically appraise why the
law exists, what the law should cover, and on the basis of such
inquiry, how the law should change. What follows in the remainder
of this piece is a consideration of the range of issues relating to
international trusteeship that such an appraisal needs to take into
account.
B. Occupation Law: Compatibility with Transformation and
Adequacy as a Framework for Regulation
The occupation of Iraq by the CPA in 2003 brought to
prominence the long-standing question concerning the extent to
which occupation law prevents occupying powers from
transforming the political and economic structures of occupied
territory and, if so, whether the operatiQn of this law should be
questioned and/or modified or supplemented by other rules.
Clearly, the notion that a territory is not to be considered part of
the sovereign territory of the occupant is tied to the notion that the
occupier should not alter the economic and political status quo. ,
Comparing annexation with political and economic
transformation, Adam Roberts states that although they are
"conceptually and legally very different, they do have one thing in
common-they tend to involve extending to the occupied territory
the type of political system adhered to by the occupying power." 10
This takes things back to 1907 (and beyond that, to the Hague
Regulations of 1899), since the norm of occupation law most often
cited to illustrate a status quo orientation is the obligation in the
Hague Regulations that occupying states are obliged to respect,
104. On the issue of a lack of sovereignty as title, see supra text accompanying note 7.
105. Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 1, at 582-83.
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"unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." 'O
Some scholars, such as Adam Roberts, seem to take a fairly
expansive view of what is permissible under occupation law. 
07
Others, such as David Scheffer, argue that occupation law does
have a strong status quo orientation and, as such, is at odds with
.the transformation agenda. "° On their own terms, the latter
106. Hague Regulations 1907, supra note 6, art. XLIII. See also, in identical terms,
Hague Regulations 1899, supra note 6, art 43. For commentary, see, e.g., BENVENISTI,
supra note 1, at 7.
107. In his survey of occupations published in 1984, Adam Roberts describes how
many, in their transformatory activities, "went beyond the letter of the Hague regulations,
yet fell short of annexation or assumption of sovereignty." Roberts, What is a Military
Occupation?, supra note 7, at 269. In both that survey and a later piece written in the
context of the occupation of Iraq, Roberts takes a fairly expansive view of what is possible
under occupation law, but also, in the latter article, accepts that this normative framework
can be supplemented from other sources in the case of so-called "transformatory"
occupations. See Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation, supra note 1. Eyal
Benvenisti states that "It]he occupant's powers have expanded through time to cover
almost all the areas in which modern governments assert legitimacy to police, a far cry
from the turn of the century laissez-faire conception of minimal governmental
intervention." BENVENISTI,.supra note 1, at 6. Discussing Security Council Resolution
1483 of May 22, 2003, which some claim authorized the political and economic
transformation of Iraq by the CPA, Benvenisti states that the resolution:
[E]nvisions the role of the modern occupant as the role of the heavily involved
regulator, when it calls upon the occupants to pursue an "effective
administration" of Iraq. This call stands in contrast to the initial orientation of
the Hague Regulations, which envisioned the disinterested occupant who does
not intervene in the lives of the occupied population.
Id. at 11.
108. Scheffer, supra note 7. In general, Scheffer argues that transformation "requires
strained interpretations of occupation law." Id. at 843. The law of occupation in Geneva
Convention IV is "far more relevant to a belligerent occupation than to an occupation
designed to liberate a society from its repressive governance and transform it as a nation
guided by international norms and the self-determination of its liberated populace." Id. at
849. Discussing peacekeeping in particular, he argues that the full operation of occupation
law may be "inappropriate and even undesirable in many situations." Id. at 848.
Discussing Adam Roberts' broad conception, in his 1984 article, of what is possible under
occupation law, Scheffer argues that the attempt to square occupation law with the
realities of modern occupations is "increasingly artificial and begs for an alternative legal
framework that more accurately reflects the development of key areas of international law
and that recognizes ... the political realities of modern practice." Id. at 848-49. Simon
Chesterman and Steven Ratner have made similar arguments about ITA missions. Simon
Chesterman states that "[a]s the purpose of transitional administration is precisely to
change the laws and institutions, further legal authority is therefore required."
CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE, supra note 67, at 7. The principles of occupation law
are "at odds" with those ITA projects... where the entire purpose of temporary
occupation was to change the political structures in the occupied territory." Id. at 145.
Discussing this issue, Steven Ratner states that "for international organization missions,
the status quo is a problem to be overcome, not a situation to maintain." Ratner, supra
note 7, at 700. Scheffer, discussing peacekeeping, states that the full operation of
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arguments are sometimes overstated when they are made in
relation to all forms of international trusteeship. Some
manifestations of this activity might not involve transformation, as
discussed further below. UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia, for
example, was primarily concerned with enabling territorial
transfer, rather than "state-building."' 9 More fundamentally,
however, these arguments assume that transformation is
something that is legitimate and to be enabled by international
law. This assumption will be considered further in due course.
David Scheffer's argument covers not only the question of
occupation law prohibiting certain aspects of transformatory
projects, but also, more broadly, whether occupation law by itself
is sufficient as a general regime of regulation, given the wide-
ranging activities engaged in during such occupations. He argues
that "the dominant premise of occupation law has been that
regulation is required for the military occupation of foreign
territory, but not necessarily for its transformation." 110 For
Scheffer, it is necessary to move "beyond" occupation law, to a
wider normative regime, taking in "other principles of modern
international law pertaining, for example, to human rights, self-
determination, the environment, and economic
development.. ." , ,
C. Human Rights Law: Should it Apply?
The suggestion that human rights norms are needed as part of
the regulatory framework brings things back to the discussion of
the extraterritorial application of that area of international law.
The question of whether human rights law should apply relates to
the earlier question of whether it applies, since one must consider
what the underlying rationale for international human rights law is
in this regard. For example, the norms of treaty interpretation
require a consideration of the "object and purpose" of the
instrument in question when construing the meaning of the
substantive norms contained within it. 12 Indeed, this form of
occupation law may be 'inappropriate and even undesirable in many situations'; Scheffer,
supra note 7, at 848.
109. On UNTAES generally, see supra note 53.
110. Scheffer, supra note 7, at 848 (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 843.




inquiry is especially significant for issues where the relevant
provisions are on their face unclear, the cases and other
authoritative commentary provide only limited assistance, and
state practice is not particularly helpful in suggesting a clear,
consistent, or unified position. All of these elements are present in
the case of the extraterritorial application of human rights law. 113
One relevant issue of principle is the idea of the social
contract: rooting the requirement of rights and their protection
through law in the contract between members of the community
and the state, which in turn provides the legitimacy for the state. 114
A traditional basis on which the community has been understood
is in terms of nationality. Contractual theories, by definition, do
not address requirements of justice arising in the context of the
interaction between -the community (and its officials) and
individuals who do not belong to it. When "belonging" is defined
according to nationality, foreigners are left outside the frame.
Thus, John Locke excludes foreigners from the social contract and
the protection of citizenship rights:
Foreigners, by living all their Lives under another Government,
and enjoying the Privileges and Protection of it, though they are
bound, even in Conscience, to submit to its Administration, as
far forth as any Denison; yet do not thereby come to be Subjects
or Members of that Commonwealth. 15
Although ideas of rights and their protection through law
have shifted so that most international law rights guarantees are
not now understood as being tied to citizenship exclusively, °
113. See generally sources cited supra note 100.
114. The canonical works on social contract theory include THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 94 (Richard Tuck ed., rev. student ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651);
JOHN LOCKE, TwO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed., Harvard Univ. Press
1999) (1971).
115. LOCKE, supra note 114,at 349 (italics in original).
116. In international human rights law, the shift away from nationality exclusively is
effected through conceiving human rights obligations in relation to the state's
"jurisdiction" rather than its own nationals. On this conception of responsibility, see the
sources cited above supra, note 100. As noted by the Human Rights Committee in relation
to ICCPR, "[iun general, the rights set forth in the Covenant apply to everyone...
irrespective of his or her nationality or statelessness." U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, '11, (Apr. 11, 1986),
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 18, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 15]. The preamble of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man states that "the essential rights of man are not derived from the
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contemporary rights discourse is perhaps still focused
predominantly on the nexus between the state and its territory.
John Rawls' contractarian theory of justice, for example, concerns
"the basic structure of society conceived for the time being as a
closed system isolated from other societies." 7
Bodies representing three leading international judicial or
quasi judicial institutions monitoring the application of
international legal instruments on civil and political rights-the
United Nations Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court and
Commission of Human Rights-have all made statements to the
effect that, as a matter of principle, this area of international
human rights law should apply extraterritorially. ,' In particular, it
has been suggested that human rights law should apply to
extraterritorial state action in order to prevent three outcomes
from occurring as a consequence of the extraterritorial nature of
the action:
1. A double standard of legality oerating as between the
territorial and extraterritorial locus;
2. A generalized distinction in the degree of human rights
protection operating indirectly on the grounds of nationality; '20
3' A vacuum in rights protection being created through the act
of preventing the existing sovereign from safeguarding rights. 121
The point is not that these three outcomes are necessarily
unjustified in all circumstances (though they might be), but, rather,
fact that he is a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of his human
personality." American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted by the
Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotd, Colombia, 1948, OAS Res.
XXX (1948), preamble. On the rights of aliens in international human rights law, see, e.g.,
General Comment No. 15, supra, passim.
117. RAWLS, supra note 114, at 7.
118. See Wilde, Legal "Black Hole"?, supra note 100, at 790-7.
119. Lopez Burgos, supra note 100, 12.3; Celiberti de Casariego, supra note 100,
10.3; Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. $1 71, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; search "Issa" and "Turkey");
Solomou v. Turkey, App. No. 36832/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. $$ 45 (2008), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; search "Solomou"). For
commentary, see Wilde, Legal 'Black Hole"?, supra note 100, at 790-2.
120. See Coard v. U.S., Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99,
OEA/Ser.L./VtII.85, doc.9 rev. 37 (1999); General Comment No. 31 on Article 2, supra
note 89, 10. For commentary, see Wilde, Legal "Black Hole"?, supra note 100, at 791-92.
121. See Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 78, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case
Title "Cyprus" and "Turkey"); Wilde, Legal "Black Hole"?, supra note 100, at 792-97.
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that they should not subsist merely because of the extraterritorial
locus in which the acts take place. It is this situation that is avoided
through the application of human rights obligations to
extraterritorial state actions.
Arguments are also made on the other side, for example,
asking whether the application of human rights norms somehow
prevents an occupying power from doing all it needs to, given the
special policy requirements in the occupation context. Does one of
the key elements for permissible derogations in the main human
rights treaties on civil and political rights mentioned earlier-that
there is a war or public emergency threatening the life of the
nation-only apply to domestic emergency situations, thereby
preventing the state from being able to enter derogations in
relation to its activities abroad, in turn preventing it from taking all
the measures necessary in the occupation context? 22
122. On derogations, see ICCPR, supra note 95, art. 4; ECHR, supra note 95, art. 15;
Am. Convention, supra note 95, art. 27. On this area of the law, see, for example, Aksoy v.
Turkey, App. No. 21987/93, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260, 2270, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case
Title "Aksoy"); Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 14553/89,
14554/89, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select
case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case Title "Brannigan"); Brogan v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 11209/84, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 27-28 (1988), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case
Title "Brogan"); Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
31-32 (1978), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select
Decisions; search Case Title "Ireland" and "United Kingdom"); Cyprus v. Turkey, 4 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 482 ; Denmark Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece, App. Nos.
3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67, 3344/67, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 1 (Eur. Comm'n H.R.),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions;
search Case Title "Denmark" and "Greece"); Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, 3 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) T 17 (1961), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select
HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case Title "Lawless"); Judicial Guarantees in States of
Emergency, Advisory Opinion, OC-9/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 9 (Oct. 6, 1987);
Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) No. 8 (Jan. 30, 1987); Silva v. Uruguay, Communication No. 34/1978, Views of the
Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/12/D/34/1978 (Apr. 8, 1981); U.N. H.R.
Comm., General Comment No. 29 States of Emergency (Article 4). 2, U.N. Doc.
CCPRIC/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001); DAVID HARRIS, MICHAEL O'BOYLE,
EDWARD BATES & CARLA BUCKLEY, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS ch. 16 (2d ed., Oxford University Press 2009); R. Higgins, Derogations
Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 281; Marks, supra note 103. On
derogations in relation to extraterritorial situations, see Bankovid v. Belgium and 16
Other Contracting States, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 62 (Grand Chamber), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case
Title "Bankovi6").
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Another relevant issue of principle is the right of self-.
determination of those in the occupied/administered territory. "' It
might be asked here whether it is compatible with this right for a
foreign state's own human rights obligations to be, in a sense,
imposed on the population of an occupied territory. Within this
general question, it is necessary to consider whether a distinction
should be made between universal standards and/or standards
binding on both the occupied territory and the occupying state, on
the one hand, and the standards binding only on the latter entity
and/or conceived with a particular, spatially-defined political
community in mind, such as the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) and its Protocols, on the other hand. 124 Moreover,
123. On self-determination, see, e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 1(2), 55; ICCPR, supra note
95, at art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), Annex, U.N. Doc. A/4651 (Dec. 15, 1960);
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 3, U.N. Doc. A/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960); Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc.
A/5217 (Oct. 24, 1970); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1970 I.C.J. 16, (June 21); Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion,
1975 I.C.J 12, (Oct. 16); Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 1998 ILM
37 (Can.) [hereinafter Reference re: Secession of Quebec]. The academic commentary is
voluminous. See, e.g., W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert A. Nicholas ed.,1977); HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY,
SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING
RIGHTS (1990); THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES (James Crawford ed., 1992); ANTONIO
CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL (1995); KAREN
KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 109-211 (2002);
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 20, at 108-
128; Antonio Cassese, The Self-Determination of Peoples, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 92, 92-113
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981); MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION (Christian
Tomuschat ed., 1993); Drew, supra note 81; SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: QUEBEC AND LESSONS LEARNED (Anne Bayefsky ed., 2000); WILDE,
INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, at ch. 5 § 5.2.
124. The Preamble to the ECHR states that, "[t]he governments signatory hereto,
being members of the Council of Europe. .. [b]eing resolved, as the governments of
European countries which are like-minded and have a common heritage of political
traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first steps for the collective
enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration .... ECHR,
supra note 95, at pmbl. ECHR jurisprudence frequently references this "common
heritage" when construing the meaning of treaty provisions. See, e.g., Golder v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 34 (1975), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-law; select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case
Title "Golder"); United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, App. No.
19392/92, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 45, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select case-
law; select HUDOC; select Decisions; search Case Title "United Communist Party of
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would the requirement of the provision of remedies flowing from
applicability of human rights law be impractical-would this lead
to overstretch on the part of national and international judicial
bodies concerned with human rights, and are national courts, given
their remoteness from the theatre of operations, capable of
handling cases concerning actions abroad? 15
It is, of course, difficult to approach these issues in the
abstract since much depends not on whether human rights law
applies, but rather what it would require if it were to apply,
something which is, in part, mediated by the issue discussed earlier
of the interplay between human rights law and other areas of law
also applicable in the occupation context.
VII. TRUSTEESHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY
David Scheffer's argument about the inadequacies of
occupation law is made by focusing on transformatory
occupations: if the status quo policy associated with the Hague
Regulations is not followed in certain occupations and, implicitly,
if this is, in some cases, legitimate, then the regulatory regime
needs to move on and accommodate a broader range of activities
performed during occupations. In certain respects, this echoes
colonial-era arguments about placing colonial administration
under a structure of accountability. One benefit of acknowledging
the connections between occupation and colonial trusteeship-
between Hague 1899/1907 and Berlin in 1884-1885-is in being
able to draw on those related debates. Before doing so, it is
necessary to review the provision of international accountability
mechanisms in relation to some of the main forms of international
trusteeship.
Turkdy"). For academic commentary, see, e.g., Steven Greer, Constitutionalizing
Adjudication under the European Convention on Human Rights, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 405 (2003). For one judicial consideration of whether applying a contracting state's
ECHR obligations to that state's actions in a foreign state not also bound by the ECHR
would amount to "human rights imperialism," see R (Al-Skeini) v. Sec'y of State for
Defence (The Redress Trust Intervening), [2007] 3 W.L.R. 33, 78, UKHL 26 (U.K.).
For commentary, see Wilde, Complementing Occupation Law, supra note 100; Wilde, Al-
Skeini, supra note 100.
125. On the provision of remedies, see, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 95, at art. 2(3); ECHR,
supra note 95, at art. 13; Am. Convention supra note 95, at art. 25; Convention Against
Torture, supra note 99, at arts. 13, 14; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note
99 (contains no explicit requireme.nt of provision of a domestic remedy for violation).
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In one sense, international territorial administration is a fully
internationalized version of international trusteeship, in that the
actor involved as trustee is an international organization rather
than an individual state or groups of states. In another sense,
however, international territorial administration marks a step
away from internationalization, in that, in certain respects, it is not
subject to international scrutiny equivalent to that which operated
with respect to the Mandate and Trusteeship arrangements, and,
as far as the UN Charter is concerned, colonialism. With the
Mandate arrangements, oversight of different kinds was provided
by the League of Nations Assembly, the Council, the Permanent
Mandates Commission (to whom individuals in the Mandates
could bring petitions), the Mandates section of the Secretariat,
other League bodies, and the possibility that issues relating to the
Mandates could be brought before the Permanent Court of
International Justice. 126 Oversight was exercised in relation to
Trust Territories by the UN General Assembly and the
Trusteeship Council and through the possibility that issues relating
to Trust Territories could be brought before the International
Court of Justice. 127 Oversight was exercised in relation to Non-Self-
Governing territories through the reporting obligations under
Article 73(e) of the UN Charter. 2
126. See generally the relevant sources cited supra, note 17, and in particular HALL,
MANDATES, supra note 17, passim, especially at 32, 48-52, pt. 1II, Annexes VII, VIII, IX
and, on the ILO in particular, 249-55; Hales, Reform and Extension, supra note 15, at 204-
63; ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, supra note 11, at 151 et seq (on the Permanent Mandates
Commission in particular); CRAWFORD, ARGUMENT AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS,
supra note 20, at 265-73 (also on the Permanent Mandates Commission in particular).
127. See the relevant sources cited supra, note 17.
128. U.N. Charter art. 73(e). See HALL, MANDATES, supra note 17, at 285-90; USHA
SUD, UNITED NATIONS AND THE NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES 1, 2 (1965);
YASSIN EL-AYOUTY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND DECOLONIZATION: THE ROLE OF
AFRO-ASIA 181 (1971); MAURICE BARBIER, LE COMITt DE DtCOLONISATION DES
NATIONS UNIES (R. Pichon & R. Durand-Auzias eds., Librairie G6neral6 de Droit et de
Jurisprudence 1974); S. HASAN AHMAD, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE COLONIES,
222, 223 (1974); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW , supra note 20, at 291-95 and
sources cited therein; CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 20, at ch. 14, passim; Fastenrath, supra note 17, at 1091-93; see also The United
Nations and Decolonization, http://www.un.org/depts/dpi/ decolonization (last visited Dec.
21, 2009) (covering both Non-Self-Governing and Trusteeship territories). For a
characteristically insightful, cross-cutting analysis of the issue of legal responsibility with
respect to trusteeship arrangements, see Reisman, supra note 20, at 236-37.
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The UN Trusteeship Council was mothballed with the end of
the final Trust arrangement in 1994. 129 However, the Trusteeship
System was and still is open to further territories, and can include
arrangements where the administering authority is the UN. "
Indeed, some commentators have proposed that the Trusteeship
Council should be revived to provide oversight of ITA missions. 131
East Timor fitted into the category of a Trust territory when the
UN mission began in 1999. It had been detached from what was, in
effect, a kind of colonial power, and its people enjoyed a right .of
self-determination but were deemed incapable of self-
administration in the short term. "2 Despite this, the Trusteeship
Council was not revived for the East Timor administration project.
Indeed, there seems to be an international consensus that the
Council be abolished, as proposed by then Secretary-General Kofi
Annan and endorsed by the General Assembly in 2005. '33
Attention has shifted towards the new Peacebuilding Commission
as a body that might become involved in such oversight, although
the prospects here would not seem to be that significant. "
Not only have ITA trusteeships not been subjected to much
international oversight; as mentioned at the start of this piece, they
have also been criticised on human rights grounds, for the lack of
review mechanisms on the ground, and particular practices
conducted, notably the use of security detentions in Kosovo. 135
129. See U.N. Trusteeship Council, http://www.un.org/documents/tc.htm (last visited
Dec. 21, 2009).
130. See U.N. Charter arts 77, 81.
131. See, e.g., Matthias Ruffert, The Administration of Kosovo and East Timor by the
International Community, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q..613, 631) (2001); Parker, supra note 20,
at 43-50.
132. On the legal status of East Timor during the period of UN administration, see
WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2 at 178-188, and
sources cited therein.
133. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General in Larger Freedom,
Towaids Development, Security and Human Rights for All, 165-66, 218, delivered to the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005); World Summit Outcome, G.A.
Res. 60/1, 1 176, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 60/1].
134. The creation of the Peacebuilding Commission was recommended by the General
Assembly in 2005. See G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 133, 176. On the establishment of the
Commission, see also S.C. Res. 1645, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec.20, 2005); G.A. Res.
60/180, 2, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/180 (Dec. 30, 2005). On the Peacebuilding Commission
see United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, http://www.un.orglpeace/peacebuilding
(last visited Dec.. 21, 2009).
135. OMBUDSPERSON INST. KOSOVO, supra note 5, at 3, 7. For criticism of UNMIK,
see the first three annual reports and the ten special reports of the Ombudsperson
Institution in Kosovo, available at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org. For criticism
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Underlying such commentary is the widely-held assumption that
ITA should be made fully accountable. If the UN is acting as the
government, then it should be subject to the same checks and
balances as any other government.
As previously mentioned, trusteeship was seen as a means to
reconceive colonial rule as humanitarian, " ' in some cases to
replace earlier forms of rule understood as having been
exploitative. 7 In the context of the belligerent occupations to
which the Hague Regulations apply, the desire was to prevent
abuses and exploitation commonly associated with the conduct of
such occupations in the past. " Trusteeship requires accountability
because of the imbalance in the power relationship between the
trustee and the ward, and the resulting possibilities for abuse. As
Michael Reisman observes in his discussion of the law applicable
to trusteeship arrangements, the requirement of accountability is
rooted in the fact that "the power relationship between the parties
concerned is manifestly asymmetrical." "' In other words, it is not
enough to humanize forms of foreign domination to ensure that
they operate for the benefit of the local population; there must
also be mechanisms to ensure these humanitarian standards are
adhered to. Those who advocated reconceiving colonialism to
operate on the basis of trust did so in part because this would
provide a basis for subjecting colonial administration to third party
from the UN Human Rights Committee, see Observations of the Human Rights
Committee, supra note 4, T 17. For criticism by the Council of Europe, see Kosovo: The
Human Rights Situation, supra note 4, 3, 40-41, 89, 94, 97-98; European Commission for
Democracy Through Law, Opinion on Human Rights in Kosovo: Possible Establishment
of Review Mechanisms, CDL-AD (2004) 33 (Oct. 11, 2004), available at
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2004/CDL-AD(2004)033-e.asp. In relation to the
implementation of the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Protection of
National Minorities, see Council of Europe, First Opinion of the Advisory Committee on
Kosovo, 132-33, COM (2005) 192 (Dec. 14, 2005). For NGO criticism, see, e.g.,
International Officials Flout International Law, supra note 4; Vetevendosje Movement
Manifesto,
http://www.vetevendosje.org/sh/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=889 (last
visited Dec. 21, 2009). See also supra note 5 and corresponding text. Many of the academic
commentators listed in Wilde supra note 2, List of Sources, section 5.2.7, are critical of
UNMIK's human rights record.
136. See supra, text accompanying note 18.
137. See supra text accompanying note 19.
138. Se, supra, text accompanying note 34.
139. Reisman, supra note 20, at 232.
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review. 140 So Edmund Burke regarded accountability to be "of the
very essence of every trust." 14
Who, then, should international trusteeships be accountable
to? In the context of ITA, Richard Caplan asks:
Whose opinion should count... ? International transitional
authorities cannot function as governments answerable
primarily to the people whose territories they administer.
International trusteeships are not representative
142democracies ....
Even if the international administrators have not been elected
by the people they govern, does this necessarily mean that they
should not be answerable to them? Again in the context of ITA,
Simon Chesterman argues:
[Flinal authority remains with the international presence and -it
is misleading to suggest otherwise. If the local population had
the military and economic wherewithal to provide for their
security and economic development then a transitional
administration would not have been created. Where a
transitional administration is created, its role is-or should be-
precisely to undertake military, economic, and political tasks
that are beyond existing local capacities. 143
The suggestion is that direct accountability to the people is at
odds with the underlying enterprise: foreign actors have taken
over control of governance precisely because of a judgment
concerning the inability or unwillingness of the local population to
perform this role themselves, either at all, or in a manner that
conforms to certain policy objectives. To render the projects
directly accountable to the local population in any meaningful
way-i.e., in a way that meant policies were altered to take into
account the views of the population-would be to miss the point of
the enterprise. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, the High
Representative sometimes removed elected officials from office,
because the policies espoused by the officials in question, such as
what was deemed to be extremist nationalism, ran counter to the
political agenda OHR had for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
144
Necessarily, this goes against the popular will insofar as it was
140. See sources cited supra note 7.
141. Burke, supra note 11, at 411.
142. CAPLAN, supra note 67, at 246 (citation omitted).
143. CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE, supra note 67, at 143.
144. On OHR, see supra note 82.
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meaningfully exercised in the vote that brought the official in
question to office in the first place.
Even on its own terms, however, such an argument only goes
so far. It only applies to policies concerned with remedying
problems associated directly with the local population. For
missions concerned with enabling the transfer of the territory from
one political group to another, for example, such as UNTAES
transferring control from local Serbs to Croatia, there is nothing
contradictory with the mission's objective in making the policies it
promotes during the period of administration accountable directly
to the local population. ' The fact that a mission is intended to
hand the territory over to another sovereign after an interim
period does not by itself necessitate, for example, an ability to
make decisions about the economy of the territory during that
period without having to account to the local population in doing
SO.
Even in ITA mandates responding to perceived problems
with the way local actors carry out governance, the mandate itself
should not be taken for more than it is. A mandate to foster
economic development and reconstruction, for example, does not
by itself presuppose that the local population should not determine
the economic model being implemented in the territory. In the
case of East Timor, for example, development was needed because
the East Timorese had been denied self-determination, not
because the local population was incapable of making decisions on
economic matters. " Part of the answer to the accountability issue,
then, concerns the scope of the mandate and what this means in
terms of decision-making. 147
Moreover, accountability issues run much wider than the
particular policies being promoted: corruption, mismanagement,
and human rights abuses are not part of the mandate of the
projects, and to exercise scrutiny over them is not to undermine
the policy objectives of the missions. Effective accountability
mechanisms concerning such matters are not incompatible with
145. On UNTAES, see supra note 53.
146. On the background to and UN administration mission in East Timor, see the
citation supra note 41.
147. In both Kosovo and East Timor, the UN set up bodies to which certain
prerogatives were devolved, but final authority on decision making always resided in the
head of the UN mission. See the discussion in WILDE, INTERNATIONAL
TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION Ch. 1, notes 1 and 2.
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the idea of trusteeship itself. Indeed, for those projects concerned
with transforming the politics of the territory along the lines of the
rule of law and the promotion of human rights, a key component
of "tutelage" is leading by example.
As reflected in the quotation from the Human Rights
Ombudsperson at the start of this piece, critics of the
unaccountability of the ITA projects often express surprise at this
situation via wry remarks about the irony of the UN seeking to
promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law while acting
in a manner that is undemocratic, violative of human rights, and
above the law." As far as mechanisms to remedy this at the
international level go, critics often call for the Trusteeship Council
to be revived to supervise ITA missions. "'
These arguments, however, perhaps fail to give due weight to
the possibility that in the case of international organization-
conducted trusteeship, the modern counterpart to the trusteeship
of the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 operates in a climate of
unaccountability precisely because it is conducted by the UN;
moreover, the lack of effective international scrutiny of all modern
trusteeships can be understood, in part, somewhat paradoxically
because the idea of trusteeship itself is of questionable
international legitimacy.
When the trusteeships of today are placed in the correct
historical context, including the key moment of the Hague
Regulations, their unaccountable nature is less of a surprise. The
non-revival and proposals to dismantle the UN Trusteeship
Council make sense. In the case of UN-conducted trusteeships,
one part of the explanation is the normative portrayal of
international organizations as humanitarian and acting in the
interests of the international community as a whole. This is
contrasted with the normative portrayal of states as always
potentially imperial and self-serving. However simplistic and
problematic such ideas may be, they are relevant in explaining why
the same normative push for international accountability in the
context of colonial (i.e., state-conducted), and occupation
trusteeship, has not been evident in the case of ITA. 0 More
148. See generally OMBUDSPERSON INST. Kosovo, supra note 5.
149. • See supra note 131.
150. See WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, at
ch. 8 § 8.7.1 and sources cited therein (on critiques of colonial trusteeship based on the
normative character of states as colonial administrators); id. at ch. 8 § 8.7.2.3. (on ideas of
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fundamentally, however, one has to take into account a further,
key normative regime in international law and public policy that is
often overlooked in discussions of trusteeship, and yet, is
potentially relevant to all forms of trusteeship.
VIII. THE MISSING ISSUE AND AREA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-
SELF-DETERMINATION
Half way into the lifespan of the Hague Regulations of 1907,.
the profound shift in international policy and law that led to the
self-determination entitlement repudiated the legitimacy of the
idea of introducing and maintaining trusteeship. 151 Administration
by outside actors, necessarily preventing self-administration, was
considered ipso facto objectionable. "2 The Hague model of
mitigating existing occupation through trusteeship continued, but,
crucially, there was now a clear obligation to bring such
occupations, alongside other situations of foreign domination, to a
quick end and, indeed, not to engage in them in the first place.
In the particular case of foreign administration operating on a
trust basis, freedom and independence were no longer to be
granted if and when the stage of development had reached a
certain level as in the past; it was now an automatic entitlement.
Under Article 3 of General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 1960,
legitimacy relating to ITA rooted in the normative character of international organizations
as territorial administrators); id. at ch. 8 .§ 8.7.2, ch. 9 § 9.2.2 (on other ideas of legitimacy).
151. On self-determination, see the sources cited above note 123.
152. On the absolutist rejection of foreign territorial administration, see WILDE,
INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, at 385-86, and sources
cited therein. In the words of Robert Jackson:
For several centuries prior to the middle of the twentieth century, an activist
doctrine of military intervention and foreign rule was a norm that was imposed
by the West on most of the world. By 1960 that old doctrine had been
completely repudiated by international society. That was not because trusteeship
could not produce peace, order, and good governance in some places. It was
because it was generally held to be wrong for people from some countries to
appoint themselves and install themselves as rulers for people in other
countries .... Self-government was seen to be morally superior to foreign
government, even if self-government was less effective and less civil and foreign
government was more benevolent. Political laissez-faire was adopted as the
universal norm of international society.
JACKSON, THE GLOBAL COVENANT, supra note 11, at 314. In the words of William Bain,
"the idea of trusteeship... was relegated to the dustbin of history along with the
legitimacy of empire" because of a "normative shift whereby independence became an
unqualified right and colonialism an absolute wrong." BAIN, supra note 11, at 4, 134.
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[I]nadequacy of political, economic, social or educational
preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying
independence. 13
As Robert Jackson states:
Independence was a matter of political choice and not empirical
condition. "4
Moreover, in the words of William Bain:
[D]ecolonization abolished the distinction upon which the idea
of trusteeship depended. There were no more "child-like"
peoples that required guidance in becoming "adult" peoples:
everyone was entitled by right to the independence that came
with adulthood. Thus it no longer made any sense to speak of a
hierarchical world order in which a measure of development or
a test of fitness determined membership in the society of
states. 155
Concerns by western states regarding "underdevelopment" in
the global south, and activities by them to try and "improve" this
situation shifted into the arena of what is now called "aid" or
"development assistance."
56
Given this normative position, it is possible that, although, in
fact, trusteeship continued, this was only deemed acceptable in a
few places. More generally, there is considerable international
resistance to trusteeship as a general idea, particularly, obviously,
amongst G77 states. 157
To revive the Trusteeship Council would be to accept that the
self-determination paradigm has somehow become qualified-that
trusteeship is back as a legitimate feature of international public
policy. Formalizing an accountability mechanism would inevitably
153. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 123, 13.
154. See JACKSON, THE GLOBAL COVENANT, supra note 11, at 95. Of course, which
particular associations of people could claim independence or, put differently, which
territorial units would form the basis for independence were, in part, a matter of the
"empirical condition."
155. BAIN, supra note 11, at 135.
156. For an example of commentary on this link between contemporary notions of
development assistance and the activities of colonial trusteeship, see id. at 7.
157. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The
Responsibility to Protect 43, 5.24 (2001), available* at http://www.iciss.cafpdf/
Commission-Report.pdf; Ruffert, supra note 131, at 631; CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE
PEOPLE, supra note 67, at 33; S. Chesterman, Virtual Trusteeship, in THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21 CENTURY, 219, 222 (D. Malone ed., 2004).
S. Chesterman, Occupation as Liberation: International Humanitarian Law and Regime
Change, 18 ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS 3,51, 57 (2004).
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represent the formalizing and legitimizing of the trusteeship
paradigm itself. If- there is no general acknowledgment that
trusteeship is back as a legitimate feature of international public
policy, then it becomes more difficult to make the case for greater
international accountability. The denial of accountability, then, is
in one sense structurally connected to the self-determination
entitlement.
The self-determination entitlement is crucial not only in terms
of the legitimacy of the existence of trusteeship; it is also
fundamental to the legitimacy of what is done during trusteeships,
including occupations. As previously discussed, the Hague model
of preserving the status quo is seen as pass by commentators such
as David Scheffer because it is viewed as placing an impediment to
profound political and economic transformation. So, to borrow
Scheffer's word, it is necessary to move "beyond" this paradigm.
Such an argument must, however, take into account the fact that
international law did move "beyond" merely humanizing the
conduct of foreign domination as was attempted at the Hague,
more radically to repudiate the legitimacy of this domination itself.
As mentioned, David Scheffer includes human rights law as one of
the normative regimes he sees as potentially helpful as a'
regulatory regime for transformative occupations, but one right in
particular-self-determination-is arguably a serious impediment
to such transformations. The practice in some occupations of
altering existing law to ensure it does not violate universally
accepted human rights may not be a problem here, but of course,
transformation goes far beyond this, for example, profoundly
reorienting the economies of the territories affected without the
approval of the local population.
The Hague model, then, may actually be more consonant with
contemporary international norms than is generally acknowledged.
Although its modest ambition of reining in occupation does not go
as far as modern self-determination in providing a clear basis for
ending foreign control, this notion remains a powerful concept in
those situations where administration by foreign actors has been
allowed to happen and where choices are being made about the
extent to which foreign actors are going to determine the
economic and political system under which the local population
will live.
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